From 1920 to 1925, in addition to machine guns, automatic rifles were produced at the newly created Kovrov Arms Plant. These were fast-firing rifles of the Fedorov system of the 1916 model, also known as the Fedorov assault rifle. Fedorov conducted experiments with automatic rifles back in 1905-1906 in an experimental workshop in Oranienbaum (now Lomonosov). At the same time, he presented a prototype built on the basis of the Mosin multi-shot rifle of the 1891 model. A few years later, he created another automatic rifle, designed for a 6.5 mm caliber cartridge he independently developed. It was followed in 1916 by the already mentioned sample. Fedorov called it a light machine gun, and Nikolai Mikhailovich Filatov, a well-known specialist in the field of ballistics, later gave it the name "automatic". In Soviet literature, it is often also referred to as submachine guns.

Fedorov assault rifle model 1916

ABC 36

Indeed, the designer for the first time in the world managed to create a weapon that had the size and weight of a rifle, which could fire not only single cartridges, but also bursts like a machine gun. Therefore, the Russian city of Oranienbaum can be considered the cradle of the machine gun, and Fedorov - his spiritual father.
The new weapon, which fired Japanese rifle cartridges Arisaka M 38 6.5x50.5 HR, worked on the principle of using recoil energy, had a short-stroke barrel, a rotary bolt and a 25-round open-end magazine. Several samples were made for military testing. After special training, in December 1916, a rifle company of the 189th Izmailovsky regiment, equipped with such rapid-firing rifles, went to the front.
After the October Revolution, Fedorov, who was appointed director of the new Kovrov Arms Plant, in addition to mass production of machine guns, also dealt with his own machine guns. In September 1920, the first prototype was made, and by the end of the year - an experimental batch of 100 pieces.
When in April 1921 an order was received to start mass production of rapid-fire weapons, the monthly production volume increased to an impressive figure for those times - 50 units. These rifles were used in battles against foreign invaders. Although in general they have proven themselves well, there were also critical reviews.

When firing in bursts, only the first bullets reached the target. Even with light pollution, failures occurred. In addition, it turned out to be difficult to supply the army with ammunition. Japanese made caliber 6.5 mm. On top of that, it was decided to continue to produce only rifles and machine guns designed for the standard Mosin cartridge of 7.62 mm caliber. Therefore, production in October 1925 was stopped. Up to this point, the Kovrov Arms Plant has produced about 3200 rapid-fire rifles. In some months, up to 200 units were produced. Until 1928, these rifles remained in service with the Red Army, in particular the Moscow Infantry Regiment. But even there they lay in warehouses.
Among the specialists who monitored the production of Fedorov's rapid-firing rifles was a young talented engineer, Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov. As a senior foreman of the plant, he provided great assistance to the leading designers, participated in the creation of individual weapon assemblies, was engaged in technology, and soon he himself began to develop his own projects of small arms.

ABC 36

Bayonet knife ABC 36

His first self-loading rifle, introduced in 1926, was rejected by the admissions committee without testing. However, the automatic rifle of the 1931 model was approved for shooting tests. The commission recommended that it be transferred to the army for military trials, and the relevant department responsible for arming the army ordered its mass production to begin in the first quarter of 1934.

Automatic rifle Simonov 36

Then this decision was withdrawn. The rifle did not get into production, at least in the original version. Subsequent models were also rejected, including the 1935 automatic carbine. Only the following year, the automatic rifle, which had passed a number of comparative tests with the samples of F.V. Tokarev and V.A. Degtyarev, brought the designer a long-awaited success. This model was not a new development, but was a modification of the 1931 model, equipped with a muzzle compensator.
However, Simonov's success turned out to be very modest compared to that brought to him by the PTRS anti-tank rifle and the SKS 45 self-loading carbine adopted in the summer of 1941. Although his automatic rifle will replace the standard Mosin 1891/30 rifle. In limited quantities, the Simonov rifle was also produced in a sniper version with an optical sight.

Sniper variant ABC 36

Soviet literature reports that in 1934 and 1935, respectively, 106 and 286 units of these weapons were produced for military trials, in 1937 10280 automatic rifles were mass-produced, and in 1938 another 24401 units. Production was carried out at the Izhevsk Arms Plant. From there, on February 26, 1938, the news came that the technology had been worked out and nothing prevented the mass production of these weapons.
Given the circumstances of the time, this message was, if not exaggerated, then at least overly optimistic. Due to the complex design, the production of the Simonov rifle required a very large investment of time and money. For serial production, this model was unsuitable. How many of these rifles were produced and when their production was discontinued is unknown. Perhaps everything was limited to the figures already mentioned above, and production was stopped as soon as the Tokarev SVT 1938 and SVT 1940 self-loading rifles appeared.

Shop ABC 36

Dismantled ABC 36

The work of the automatic rifle Simonov ABC 1936 is based on the principle of removal of powder gases through a hole in the upper part of the barrel. The latter is locked by a vertically moving wedge. This design allows the bolt to lock the barrel after firing until the piston, under the action of powder gases, sinks the locking wedge. Gas pressure can be adjusted.
Ammunition is fed from a trapezoidal magazine for 15 cartridges of the Mosin type M 1908/30 caliber 7.62 mm. Shooting can be carried out with single cartridges and bursts. The firing mode is selected using a translator located on the right at the rear of the bolt box. The practical rate of single firing is 20-25 rds / min, and when firing in short bursts - 40 rds / min. Despite the fact that the magazine capacity was tripled compared to the standard Mosin rifle, the ammunition for an automatic rifle was clearly small.
The sighting device consists of a sector sight and a front sight without protection. The sight can be set at a distance of 100 to 1500 m. The length of the sight line is 591 mm, and the length of the rifling is 557 mm. A characteristic feature of this rifle is a noticeable but ineffective muzzle brake, as well as a long slot for the reloading handle.
The fact that the rifle did not justify the hopes placed on it is explained, first of all, by the complex design of the bolt. To reduce the weight of the weapon, it was necessary to make its individual parts smaller and lighter. However, there is a direct relationship between reliability and non-failure operation, labor and money costs. Weapon parts are becoming smaller and less reliable, too complex and expensive. Eventually
the costs of manufacturing and assembling such weapons are incomparable with the accuracy of their work.
Automation wore out very quickly and after a while did not work so accurately. This affected the reliability of the system. The shutter was open for any contaminants while moving forward and backward. In addition, there were other flaws: too loud sound of a shot, too much recoil and concussion when fired.
Although the automatic rifle was not in service for long. it became a kind of prototype for many other types of automatic weapons. In this sense, the statements of an expert from one of the American military magazines made in August 1942 are indicative: “The Russian army received automatic weapons before we had the Garand rifle. Even later, the German army introduced an automatic rifle." These words probably also apply to the Tokarev SVT 1938 and SVT 1940 self-loading rifles.

Finnish soldiers with Soviet rifles ABC-36, SVT and Finnish machine gun Lahti-Saloranta M/26

ABC 36

Characteristics: Fedorov rapid-fire rifle model 1916 (Fedorov assault rifle)
Caliber, mm ............................................... .........................................6.5
Muzzle velocity (Vq). m/s...............................670
Weapon length, mm .............................................. .........................1045
Rate of fire, rds/min....................................... ..............600
Supply of ammunition ............................... carob magazine
for 25 rounds
Mass in a charged state, kg .............................................. 4.93
Cartridge................................................. ..............................6.5x50.5 HR
Barrel length, mm ............................................... ...............................520
Sighting range, m ....................................... 2100

Characteristics: automatic rifle ABC 1936
Caliber, mm ............................................... ...............................................7.62
Muzzle velocity (Vq), m/s .............................................. .835*
Weapon length, mm .............................................. ...................1260**
Ammunition supply ............................ trapezoidal magazine
for 15 rounds
Weight with empty magazine and bayonet, kg .............................. 4.50
Cartridge................................................. .................................7.62x54 R
Barrel length, mm ............................................... .......................615***
Grooves/Direction ............................................................... ...................4/n
Sighting range, m ............................................... 1500
Effective firing range, m .............................................. 600
* Cartridge with a light bullet.
** With an attached bayonet - 1520 mm.
*** free part- 587 mm.

Published:16 April 2014
In this article I would like to talk about a weapon that was at least 5-10 years ahead of its time, but always in the shadow of its later and more successful competitor and today unreasonably forgotten - the automatic rifle of Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov ABC-36.

Simonov automatic rifle

In this article I would like to talk about weapons that were at least 5-10 years ahead of their time, but always in the shadow of their later and more successful competitor and today unreasonably forgotten - the automatic rifle of Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov ABC-36.

Undoubtedly, for its time, this rifle was a huge achievement of Soviet weapons thought, and technology, of course, too. None of the leading states then had in their armies a light and powerful automatic rifle, which was also produced in droves. For all the general attractiveness of the idea, the level of technological development often simply did not allow creating a fail-safe system that could work well in different conditions. Only the United States forced the final development and delivery of the John Garand design to the troops, but, alas, only self-loading.

Self-loading rifle Garanda M1

The first project of an automatic rifle was created by Simonov in early 1926. Its mechanism worked on the principle of removal of powder gases. The rifle turned out to be quite simple in design, but, despite the reliable interaction of mechanisms, it had a number of significant drawbacks, such as poor layout, poor weapon balance, low accuracy, sensitivity to dust and dirt, poor performance, a very wide forearm (due to the placement gas exhaust system on the right side of the rifle

Simonov's attempts in 1928, 1930 and 1931 were also unsuccessful. present improved models of automatic rifles. Each time there were design flaws that caused delays in firing and breakdown of automation. The shortcomings were also due to the low survivability of some parts, a short aiming line, low shooting accuracy, significant weight and insufficient reliability.

And only a rifle mod. 1933 successfully passed field tests and was recommended for transfer to the army for military trials.

Experienced rifle model 1931-1933

As a result of a series of comparative tests with samples of automatic weapons of the Tokarev and Degtyarev systems, which took place in 1935-1936, top scores showed Simonov's rifle. It was adopted by the rifle units of the Red Army under the designation ABC-36 (“automatic rifle of the Simonov system, model 1936”) and put into production.

As in previous models, the operation of the ABC-36 automation was based on the principle of removing powder gases generated during firing from the muzzle of the barrel. However, this time Simonov placed the gas exhaust system above the barrel. Subsequently, such placement of the gas outlet mechanism has become a classic and is still used today. USM was designed for single fire, but allowed fully automatic fire. A powerful muzzle brake compensator and a bayonet, which, when rotated 90 °, turned into a one-legged bipod, contributed to an increase in its accuracy and efficiency. The rate of fire of the ABC-36 with a single fire reached 25 rds / min, and when firing in bursts - 40 rds / min. Thus, one fighter armed with ABC-36 could create such a density of fire that was achieved by a group of three or four shooters armed with Mosin repeating rifles.

The rifle has been produced in small batches since 1935, by March 1938 the ABC-36 was mastered and put into mass production, and was officially shown at the May Day parade of 1938. Only the 1st Moscow Proletarian Division, an elite rifle unit of the Red Army, was armed with it en masse.

Soldier of the Red Army, armed with a rifle ABC-36. Reconstruction

In total, four (!) Types of ABC-36 were produced - a standard one for arming linear rifle units, a sniper version, a carbine (including a special one, with the possibility of using PBBS!) And an option for airborne troops. All rifle models were equipped with a blade-type bayonet, and also had a groove for a bracket for an optical sight - this phenomenon became widespread on handguns only at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century. Not a single army in the world at that time could boast of having such weapons!

Variants of the ABC-36 rifle

In the figure above - installation of an optical sight on a carbine of the type SVT-38/40

The airborne version of the ABC-36 had a shortened barrel, a retractable buttstock like a DT machine gun, and a pistol grip.

The sniper version of the ABC-36 actually had no differences from the base model. In the manufacture of the rifle, which was planned to be equipped with optics, additional processing of the barrel bore was carried out to increase the accuracy of fire.

Installation of an optical sight on a rifle ABC-36. Option

Soldier of the Red Army, armed with a sniper version of the ABC-36 rifle. Lake Khasan area, Mongolia, 1938

Despite the advanced positions, the further fate of the ABC-36 was difficult. The plans for arming the Red Army with an automatic rifle were changed to a self-loading one, based on a more rational consumption of cartridges and maintaining a greater aiming range. The AVS-36 was superior to the SVT-38 in many respects, but it turned out to be less tenacious and broke more often, the design turned out to be low-tech, and the cost was higher than that of the DP-27 light machine gun.

In the course of combat use, the ABC-36 showed low performance. USM provided continuous fire too fast. Modernization did not give satisfactory accuracy. Automation ABC-36 quickly wore out and began to work less reliably. In addition, there were other complaints - a loud sound of a shot, too much recoil and shock when fired, the complexity of assembly and disassembly.

One way or another, but already in 1939, the production of ABC-36 was reduced, and in 1940 it was stopped altogether. The factories that were previously engaged in the production of ABC-36 were reoriented to the manufacture of self-loading rifles of the Tokarev SVT-38/40 system. Total production of automatic rifles of the Simonov system arr. 1936 amounted to about, according to various estimates, from 35 to 66 thousand units.

AVS-36 - Simonov automatic rifle, released in 1936. Initially, the weapon was developed as a self-loading rifle, but in the course of improvements, the designers added a burst firing mode. It is the first automatic rifle chambered for 7.62, which was adopted by the Soviet Union, and the first rifle of this class in the world, adopted in principle. In the last achievement, ABC-36 was literally a few months ahead of the American M1 Garand. Today we will consider the history of the production of the Simonov automatic rifle and its main technical parameters.

Development

The first prototype of the Simonov automatic rifle was presented back in 1926. Having considered the project proposed by S. G. Simonov, the artillery committee decided not to allow it to be tested. In 1930, the designer managed to achieve success at the weapons competition. Simonov's main competitor in the design of automatic rifles was F. V. Tokarev. In 1931, continuing to work on improving his rifle, Simonov significantly modernized it.

Confession

Simonov's automatic rifle was tested quite well at the test site, as a result of which the Soviet gunsmiths decided to release a small batch of ABC for extensive military testing. Simultaneously with the release of the first batch, it was proposed to establish a technological process in order to start mass production at the beginning of 1934. The release was planned to be established in Izhevsk, where Simonov went personally to help organize the production process. In March 1934, the USSR Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the development of capacities for the production of ABC-36 next year.

According to the test results of 1935-1936, the Simonov model proved to be much better than the Tokarev model. And this despite the fact that individual ABC samples failed during the tests. According to the conclusion of the supervisory commission, the cause of the breakdowns was manufacturing defects, and not design flaws. This was confirmed by the first prototypes of the rifle, which could withstand up to 27 thousand shots without breakdowns.

Adoption

In 1936, the Simonov automatic rifle was adopted by the USSR. It was the first automatic weapon of the Red Army chambered for a 7.62 caliber rifle cartridge. The weapon that entered service differed from the prototype in a number of design solutions.

The ABC-36 was first shown to the public at the May Day military parade. She was armed with arrows of the First Moscow Proletarian Division. On February 26 of the same year, A.I. Bykhovsky, director of the Izhevsk plant, said that the ABC (Simonov automatic rifle) was fully mastered and put into mass production.

Later, when Stalin ordered the construction of a self-loading rifle without the possibility of firing in automatic mode, the ABC-36 would be replaced by the SVT-38. The reason for this decision and the rejection of automatic firing was the saving of ammunition.

When the ABC-36 was put into service, the volume of its production increased markedly. So, in 1934, 106 copies left the assembly line, in 1935 - 286, in 1937 - 10280, and in 1938 - 23401. Production continued until 1940. By this time, almost 67 thousand rifles had been produced.

Design

The principle of operation of an automatic rifle is based on the removal of powder gases. The model can fire both single cartridges and in automatic mode. Switching firing modes is carried out by means of a special lever located on the right side of the receiver. Single mode is the main one. It was supposed to shoot in bursts in case of an insufficient number of light machine guns in the unit. As for continuous fire, it was allowed to the soldiers only in extreme cases, when there was a sudden attack of the enemy from a distance of less than 150 meters. At the same time, no more than 4 magazines could be spent in a row in order to avoid overheating and wear of the key elements of the rifle.

The gas outlet unit, the piston of which has a short stroke, is located above the barrel. vertical block(wedge), locking the barrel, moves in the grooves of the receiver. The line of movement of the block deviates from the vertical by about 5 °, which makes it easier to unlock the shutter manually. When the block moves up, it enters the grooves of the shutter and locks it. Unlocking occurs at the moment when the clutch, which is connected to the gas piston, squeezes the block down. Due to the fact that the locking block was located between the magazine and the breech of the barrel, the cartridges were fed into the chamber along a long and steep trajectory, which often led to delays. In addition, due to this feature, the receiver was impressive in length and complex in design.

Simonov's automatic rifle also had a complex bolt, inside of which were located: a striker with a spring, some parts of the trigger mechanism and an anti-bounce device. Versions of the rifle, released before 1936, differed in the device of the trigger mechanism, cut-off and stop of the mainspring.

Shooting modes

According to the instructions, the firing mode switch was blocked with a special key, access to which was only for the squad leader. In special cases, he allowed soldiers to switch their rifles to automatic mode. Whether the soldiers followed instructions is a moot point. It is curious to note that in the case of the Fedorov rifle, only the soldier who passed the corresponding exam could get a fire translator in his hands. And during the years of the Vietnam War, US officers removed the translator mechanism from the soldiers in order to avoid the possibility of firing in a burst, which, as in the case of the ABC-36, is practically useless when firing from the hands. It was recommended to shoot in automatic mode in the prone position, from the stop, with the same butt as when firing from a DP machine gun. Shooting single shots, from a standing or sitting position, the shooter held the rifle from below the magazine with his left hand.

rate of fire

The technical rate of fire of Simonov's automatic rifle was about 800 rounds per minute. However, in practice this figure was much lower. A trained shooter with pre-filled magazines fired up to 25 rounds per minute with single fire, up to 50 in bursts, and up to 80 with continuous fire. The open sight had notches in range from 100 to 1500 m, in increments of 100 m.

ammunition supply

The ammunition of the rifle was made from detachable sickle-shaped magazines holding 15 rounds. The shape of the magazine was due to the presence of a protruding rim on the used cartridge. It was possible to equip stores both separately from the weapon and on it, from standard clips. Models of the rifle, produced before 1936, could also be equipped with magazines for 10 and 20 rounds.

Bayonet knife

The barrel of Simonov's automatic rifle was equipped with a massive mount and a bayonet-knife mount. In early versions, the bayonet could be attached not only horizontally, but also vertically, down with a wedge. In this form, it was supposed to be used as a one-legged ersatz bipod for firing in the prone position. However, the description of the rifle, published in 1937, forbids such use of a bayonet-knife, prescribing instead to shoot in automatic prone mode with an emphasis on rolling or turf. In principle, this clarification was inappropriate, given that since 1936 the rifle was no longer equipped with a bipod bayonet. Apparently, the idea of ​​increasing the functionality of such an ordinary object as a bayonet, attractive in theory, did not justify itself in practice. During the march, the bayonet was carried in a sheath attached to the fighter’s belt, and it remained there when firing.

Specifications

Simonov's automatic rifle had the following parameters:

1. The mass, taking into account the bayonet with the scabbard, the optical sight and the magazine filled with cartridges, is about 6 kg.
2. The mass of the rifle without a bayonet, sight and magazine is 4,050 kg.
3. The mass of the equipped magazine is 0.675 kg.
4. Empty magazine weight - 0.350 kg.
5. The mass of the bayonet in the sheath is 0.550 kg.
6. The weight of the sight with the bracket is 0.725 kg.
7. Bracket weight - 0.145 kg.
8. Mass of moving parts (rod, bolt and cocking clutch) - 0.5 kg.
9. Magazine capacity - 15 rounds.
10. Caliber - 7.62 mm.
11. Length with bayonet - 1,520 m.
12. Length without bayonet - 1,260 m.
13. The length of the rifled part of the barrel is 0.557 m.
14. Number of grooves - 4.
15. Front sight height - 29.8 mm.
16. The shutter stroke length is 130 mm.
17. Firing range (sighting) - 1500 m.
18. Bullet flight range (adjoining) - 3000 m.
19. Bullet speed (initial) - 840 m / s.
20. Rate of fire (technical) - 800 rounds per minute.

successor

On May 22, 1938, another competition was announced for the development of a new self-loading rifle based on the removal of powder gases. The systems of Simonov, Tokarev, Rukavishnikov and other lesser-known gunsmiths took part in the competitive tests, which took place from the end of summer to the beginning of autumn of the same year. At the end of November, the final tests took place, according to the results of which, in February 1939, the Tokarev rifle, called the SVT-38, was adopted by the USSR. On the eve of this, on January 19, Simonov announced the elimination of all the shortcomings of his rifle in the hope that he would be given another chance. By the end of the spring of that year, a special commission was created to evaluate the systems of Tokarev and Simonov from the point of view of production and economic feasibility.

According to the conclusion of the commission, the SVT was recognized as simpler and less costly to manufacture. Nevertheless, the USSR Defense Committee, striving for a rapid rearmament of the army, did not retreat from the idea of ​​​​mass production of the Tokarev rifle. So the Simonov automatic rifle completed its history, the military review of which became the subject of our conversation.

The production of the Tokarev system was launched in less than six months, and on October 1, 1939, gross output began. First of all, the Tula plant was involved, which in this regard stopped production. In 1940, the model was also produced at the Izhevsk Arms Plant, which had previously produced the ABC-36.

The result of operation

AVS-36 (Simonov automatic rifle of the 1936 model) as a whole turned out to be not reliable enough for mass use in the troops. The complex design and the large number of complex-shaped parts made it too costly to manufacture in terms of time and resources. In addition, its release at almost all stages required highly qualified personnel.

The design of the rifle made it possible to assemble it without a locking block. Moreover, it was even possible to shoot from such a weapon. In the event of such a shot, the receiver collapsed, and the bolt group flew back, right into the shooter. The original wedge lock also failed. In addition, the survivability of the firing mechanism often failed.

With all this, the Simonov automatic rifle, the history of which we examined, was remembered as the first weapon of its kind, adopted for mass armament and tested in combat conditions. It also became the first type of weapon in the USSR, created by purely domestic engineers, mastered and put into mass production. For its time, the ABC-36 was an advanced rifle.

It is interesting to note that in the Finnish army, the Tokarev SVT rifle, which was considered more reliable, was preferred to captured Simonov rifles.

sniper version

In 1936, a small number of ABC sniper rifles were produced. Since the spent cartridges were thrown up and forward, the designers decided to fix the optical sight bracket to the left of the barrel axis. The optics had an aiming grid with two horizontal and one vertical thread. The exit pupil diameter was 7.6 mm; it was 85 mm away from the extreme lens of the eyepiece. The sight quadrupled the number of images. Otherwise, the sniper version did not differ from the usual Simonov automatic rifle, the photo of which will be recognized by many weapon lovers.

Frames of the old newsreel ... An inquisitive eye will always find something interesting in them. Here is Churchill walking along the line of the Soviet guard of honor. Obviously, he flew to the Yalta conference. In the hands of Soviet soldiers frozen like statues, rifles with a characteristic protective casing on the barrel, an unusual muzzle brake and a wide bladed bayonet. Churchill was noticeably pleased with the brave appearance of the Russian soldiers. Another plot. Crimea, 1942, before the attack, a Soviet sailor adjoins a bladed bayonet to exactly the same rifle. And here is a very unusual shot. A German soldier is sitting holding the same rifle. German soldier smiling...

So what kind of weapon is this, which could be at the same time beautiful in the parade, reliable in a soldier's trench and so valuable that a German soldier could be interested in it? War veterans and weapons specialists certainly understood what kind of rifle they were talking about. This is a rifle - SVT-40 - a Soviet 7.62-mm self-loading rifle of the Tokarev system arr. 1940 So why didn't she become a "victorious weapon" in that war, like, for example, a rifle mod. 1891/30 or PPSh submachine gun?

SVT has a difficult and dramatic fate. This is not just a sample of small arms of the Red Army. The Tokarev rifle was assigned a special role - to become the world's first self-loading rifle, which was supposed to completely replace the usual magazine rifle in the army.

In the world, including in Russia, interest in a self-loading rifle appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. V. G. Fedorov, developing an automatic weapon of his system, focused precisely on a self-loading rifle chambered for domestic 7.62-mm cartridges mod. 1891/08, and only by 1916 did he convert it into a 6.5 mm machine gun.

Meanwhile, in the West, a number of quite successful samples of self-loading Browning rifles mod. 1918 (USA), Mondragon arr. 1908 (Mexico), RSC arr. 1917 (France). However, these models were not so successful that they could arm the entire army.

In Russia, the development of self-loading rifles was continued after the Civil War. The first competition for the creation of a self-loading rifle was announced in 1926, for which only 3 samples of rifles were put up - V. G. Fedorov and V. A. Degtyarev.

Then two more competitions were held in 1928 and 1930, and 10 systems of self-loading rifles of the Degtyarev and Tokarev systems were already put up for the 1930 competition, but not one of them was recognized as suitable for arming the army.

Such a frequent holding of competitions testifies to the unflagging attention to "self-loading" both from the leadership of the Red Army and from the government of the USSR.

In 1927, a new direction in the development of individual automatic weapons appeared in the USSR - the first domestic submachine gun appeared. The rivalry of these types of automatic weapons - a self-loading rifle and a submachine gun, subsequently determined the appearance of the armament system of the armies of the world with individual automatic small arms. It should be noted here that in the late 20s - early 30s, the submachine gun in the USSR did not receive recognition ...

In 1931, a young designer S. G. Simonov developed a rather successful automatic rifle - ABC. The rifle was distinguished by the original design of components and mechanisms, a large-capacity magazine (15 rounds), and a neat appearance. The ABC used an unusual for domestic practice, but a practical and versatile bladed bayonet. The combination of the combat characteristics of the rifle, together with a fairly high weapon resource (27,000 shots), served as a sufficient basis for adopting the rifle into service. In tactical terms, the Simonov automatic rifle was significantly superior to the three-ruler. A shooter with ABC could achieve the same density of fire as was achieved by a group of 3 or 5 shooters armed with Mosin rifles.

In 1936, under the symbol ABC-36, the rifle was adopted by the Red Army. In total, about 66,000 rifles were produced.

But, despite the clear advantages over the Mosin rifle, the disadvantages of the ABC were also obvious. These include the complexity of manufacturing and arranging a rifle, sensitivity to the quality of steels, general unreliability of the design when working in critical conditions (dust, frost), inefficiency of automatic fire at a distance of more than 150 m.

At the end of May 1938, a new competition for the development of a self-loading rifle was announced. The tactical and technical requirements for development, signed by the Chief of the General Staff, General B. M. Shaposhnikov, stated: “... the rifle should have a weight of no more than 4.5 kg ... be simple in design, easy to use and maintain, reliable ... have high survivability. Its mechanisms should not fail under any atmospheric conditions, despite dirt and grease ... "Very stringent requirements. The designed automatic weapon with reloading mechanisms, a ten-round magazine should have weighed the same as the obviously simpler magazine rifle mod. 1891/30, whose store capacity is half that. Designers Tokarev, Rukavishnikov and Simonov took part in the competition.

The result of the tests is that not a single rifle fully meets the conditions of the competition, but the best of those presented is the Tokarev rifle. New tests are scheduled for November 1938. Again, Tokarev takes first place and on February 26, 1939, his self-loading rifle is adopted by the Red Army under the name “7.62-mm Tokarev self-loading rifle arr. 1938 (SVT-38)". The Simonov rifle (SVS) turned out to be economically much more profitable than the SVT, although it was inferior to the latter in terms of the resource of individual parts. But here's the paradox, it was the SVS that was recognized as desirable for adoption as the main model of a self-loading rifle, after appropriate refinement.

Experienced rifle Tokarev 1936. Self-loading rifle Tokarev SVT-38. Self-loading rifle Tokarev SVT-40. Automatic rifle Tokarev AVT-40

And again, the tests, and the Simonov rifle successfully passes them. But the fate of the rifles has already been decided - without waiting for the results of the latest tests, the Tokarev rifle was put into production - so great was the desire to rearm the Red Army with self-loading rifles. The first SVT-38 rifle was produced on 07/16/1939, and from October 1939, their gross production began. TOZ was the first to master the production of SVT, and since 1940, the Izhevsk Arms Plant.

Captured SVT were widely used in the Finnish army. The picture shows Finnish soldiers with SVT-38 (in the foreground) and SVT-40

According to the results of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40. and extended testing, a number of changes were made to the design of the SVT-38. The rifle was significantly lightened - from 4.9 kg to 4.63 kg (with a bayonet), a shortened bayonet was adopted for it. 04/13/1940 The People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR adopted a resolution on the adoption and start of production upgraded rifle SVT arr. 1940, along with the simultaneous curtailment of the release of the rifle mod. 1891/30 In the same year, on the basis of the SVT-40, a self-loading sniper rifle was developed and put into production, which differed from the gross SVT in the quality of the bore and the presence of an optical sight on a special bracket. By the way, the optical sight of the PU system arr. 1940 was designed specifically for the sniper SVT. Lightweight, very durable, with excellent performance, this optical sight has won universal recognition. In 1942, in a somewhat modernized version, the PU brand sight completely replaced the standard PE brand optical sight on sniper rifles mod. 1891/30 The PU sight turned out to be such a successful example of an optical sight that it is still produced under the indices T-3 and PO 3.5x24 (hunting version). In 1940, the production of sniper rifles mod. 1891/30 was discontinued.

Several types of optical sight mounts have been developed for the rifle. Above is an experimental Tokarev rifle of 1936 with an optical sight. Below is a serial SVT-40 in a sniper version

The release of SVT has been continuously growing. Before the start of World War II, about two million self-loading devices were manufactured. For example, in 1941 alone, the production of SVT amounted to 1,031,861 units, in 1942 another 2 million rifles were planned for production. By the beginning of the war, SVT were available in sufficient quantities and were mastered by the troops.

The effectiveness of Soviet self-loading rifles affected in the very first battles. The Germans often mistook fire from these rifles for machine-gun fire. During the siege of the Brest Fortress, the German infantry could not approach the range of fire of their submachine guns until the defenders ran out of ammunition. To counter rifle fire, the German infantry units were forced to bring up artillery!

Finnish sniper with captured SVT-40

Soviet self-loading rifles were distinguished by good shooting accuracy. The Nazis, not having such weapons, collected them on the battlefield and, after appropriate repairs and debugging, armed their snipers and fighters of the counter-partisan “yagd teams” (detachments of hunter-saboteurs) with them. The German soldiers considered it a great success to get Russian self-loading in battle. But not only that, the Nazis officially adopted the SVT into service with the Wehrmacht, assigning it the index “sample 453R”. It is no secret that all warring armies in some cases use enemy weapons, but they are not officially accepted into service. Adoption of an enemy weapon model means not only a high assessment of its combat properties, but also an acknowledgment of the fact that our own industry is incapable of producing something similar. So it really was. German self-loading rifles G-41 (M) and G-41 (W) - turned out to be clearly unsuitable for use in the army.

During the Second World War, Tokarev rifles were also popular in the Wehrmacht. Pictured is a German officer with an AVT-40 rifle (Stalingrad, 1942)

At the end of 1941, alarm signals began to come from the front - SVT is unreliable, gives a large percentage of delays, is sensitive to pollution and dust, and “freezes” in the cold. The accuracy of the battle of sniper SVT was recognized as insufficient and inferior to the accuracy of the battle of the sniper rifle mod. 1891/30

And immediately, without much clarification of the reasons, the production of SVT was sharply reduced. So, compared with 1941 in 1942, the production of rifles fell 5 times. At the beginning of 1942, the production of sniper three-line rifles was restored, and on 10/01/1942, the production of sniper SVT was discontinued. But it was impossible to completely stop the production of SVT - there were so few automatic weapons in the troops. Due to the lack of submachine guns and light machine guns in the troops, on May 20, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the production of Tokarev automatic rifles (AWT).

The SVT fuse box was located behind the trigger, while for the AVT-40 it was also the firing mode translator

In reports from the troops, it was noted that the AVT does not provide the necessary accuracy of fire and strength (survivability) of parts. There were such dangerous defects as rupture and non-removal of spent cartridges, non-closing of the shutter, misfires. The release of SVT and AVT continued to decline, and on 01/03/1945, the USSR State Defense Committee issued a decree to discontinue the production of SVT and AVT rifles (only two weeks earlier than a similar decree on rifles model 1891/30). After the war, the remaining SVTs were withdrawn from the troops and handed over to warehouses. SVT remained in service only in the company of the guard of honor: thus becoming a purely ceremonial weapon. It was, though honorable, but still a resignation. On this, in general, ingloriously ended combat history SVT.

Why did it happen that the SVT, which worthily passed such severe trials as the war on the Karelian Isthmus and the most difficult months of the first year of the Great Patriotic War, could not ultimately justify the hopes placed on it?

Muzzle devices of Tokarev rifles of different models (from top to bottom): experimental rifle of 1936, SVT-38, AVT-40. The shape of the muzzle device of the SVT-40 rifles of later releases was the same as that of the AVT-40.

In most literary sources, including such authoritative ones as D.N. Bolotin’s book “Soviet Small Arms”, the idea is expressed that the low reliability of both Tokarev’s self-loading and automatic rifles is explained by the use of the domestic 7.62-mm rifle for firing from them. cartridge. It is said that the cartridge has a protruding flange, large dimensions, high power, and its use does not allow creating a reliable self-loading rifle. This is a known mistake. That's not the point at all. Our rifle cartridge is not the most powerful and largest of modern rifle cartridges. The protruding flange of the rifle cartridge case makes it difficult to design a weapon, but a properly designed magazine completely eliminates its influence on the operation of the weapon's automation. The protruding flange of the same cartridge does not interfere with firing from another domestic self-loading - SVD.

Details of incomplete disassembly of CBT-40

The reasons for the failure of a self-loading rifle are different. The main thing is the incorrect, sometimes obviously illiterate operation of the rifle, the inevitable decline in the quality of the manufacture of rifles during the war, as well as the implementation of a number of erroneous decisions regarding the operation of the SVT and undermined its reputation as a reliable weapon.

A self-loading rifle, like any other automatic weapon, requires a deliberately more careful attitude than a simple magazine rifle. In the first months of the war, most of the rank and file of the Red Army, who knew how to competently operate the SVT, died or was taken prisoner.

Details of the gas engine of the SVT-40 rifle

Most of the older soldiers who came to replace them from the reserve did not understand both the design of the rifle and the need to carefully monitor it, protect it, follow the rules and the regime of cleaning and lubrication (this problem is relevant in the troops at the present time). The quality of the lubricants themselves also left much to be desired. Hence - "sticking" of moving parts in the cold. The weapon required the use of high-quality, especially frost-resistant lubricants, but there were none.

The adoption of the SVT sniper rifle as the main model of the Red Army sniper rifle was generally a very controversial decision. It is impossible to desire from an automatic weapon an accuracy of fire comparable to the accuracy of non-automatic fire. Even a modern specially designed self-loading sniper SVD rifle inferior in accuracy of battle to a sniper rifle arr. 1891/30. Moreover, the SVT will be inferior to it, which has a completely “non-sniper”, non-rigid design and an asymmetric locking unit. But, losing a rifle arr. 1891/30, in the range of effective sniper fire, a sniper armed with SVT got an invaluable opportunity to quickly fire a second aimed shot and hit (finish off) a target not hit by the first shot. The gross SVT at ranges up to 600 m had quite a decent accuracy of fire, not inferior to the carbine mod. 1938

The decision to manufacture SVT in an automatic version (AWT) finally undermined the authority of self-loading. The receiver of the rifle is not adapted to the perception of a powerful cyclic load, it simply deformed when firing in bursts - hence the ruptures of the sleeves and the undercovering of the shutter. Obviously, the troops abused the automatic fire mode, which in the service manual for the AVT is called "an auxiliary type of fire conducted with a lack of light machine guns and in exceptional moments of battle ...".

Not the last role in reducing the reliability of SVT was played by the reduced quality of their manufacture. The design did not have a strength reserve to compensate for wartime production costs - primarily because of the very strict weight restrictions incorporated into its design during development.

Of course, one cannot discount the rifle's own shortcomings - the possibility of losing the magazine, the inconvenience of disassembling the weapon and gas adjustment, sensitivity to contamination of the receiver cavity. All these "everyday" shortcomings of the weapon were not irreparable and could well be eliminated during production. By the way, some of them have been eliminated - for example, the gas regulator assembly has been simplified. But it was too late - the confidence in the self-loading rifle was completely lost.

A new attempt to introduce a self-loading weapon into service with the army in 1945 - the SKS carbine chambered in 1943, also ended in failure.

Combat tests of the carbine were successful, and the troops liked the weapon. But by that time, the first samples of machine guns had already been developed that combined the density of fire of a submachine gun with the power of the cartridge mod. 1943. For machine guns, the focus was not on accuracy, but on the density of fire.

The Kalashnikov assault rifle, which entered service with the army, for some time coexisted in the troops along with the SKS carbine, as if competing - which of them is better. As a result, the AK won - and became a symbol of Soviet weapons, and the SKS, like the SVT before it, was discontinued and later removed from the weapons system. The SCS exactly repeated the fate of the SVT, becoming the standard parade weapon of the Soviet Army.

A soldier of the Polish Army with a late-release CBT-40 rifle (the muzzle device is similar to ABT-40, but the rifle magazine is not designed for 10 rounds)

This is how the self-loading rifle ended its existence in our army as a type of individual infantry weapon. The tragic fate of the SVT gave our army and weapons science a harsh, but invaluable important lesson- automatic weapons for a Russian soldier should be very simple, extremely unpretentious, as reliable as possible and immensely tenacious. The only way. Our soldier will not accept another weapon and, sadly as it sounds, will ruin it. This is not to say that SVT is an unreliable weapon. This rifle was ruined by excessive sensitivity both to the slightest changes in the production process, and to the skill of the shooter using it. It is precisely in this, apparently, that the mystery of the popularity of the SVT among the enemy troops lies, where it was operated much more competently. This made it possible to smooth out the congenital shortcomings of the SVT and to show all best qualities embedded in the design of the Russian self-loading.

However, the fate of the Tokarevskaya SVT is still not as dull as it might seem at first glance. Our beauty - self-loading SVT is held in high esteem abroad - in the USA and, especially, in Finland, where she is known from the war of 1939-40. and are greatly appreciated. Finnish experts are still surprised how such, in their words, an excellent weapon, did not receive recognition in the Red Army, and any criticism of the SVT is perceived as blasphemy.

Sometimes CVT can be found in weapons collectors and hunters. Such a rifle, if it is in good condition, is expensive, they cherish it, they are proud of it, preferring it to other (even modern and imported) weapon systems of a similar class for its convenience, reliability and a number of individual features that make the SVT an excellent hunting weapon.

And the last. Recently, one of the repair enterprises of the Russian Defense Ministry received an order to prepare for the sale abroad of a large batch of sniper SVT. So, perhaps, soon for the old Soviet self-loading SVT will begin new life, only, unfortunately, far from our country.

Tactical and technical characteristics of Tokarev self-loading rifles

* Initial speed when firing a light bullet m = 9.6 g.

** Combat rate of fire of the AVT rifle when firing bursts

*** The mass of the magazine with cartridges.

Ruslan Chumak. A rifle ahead of its time

ABC-36. Hearing this abbreviation, many will say: well, we know, this is a 7.62-mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system mod. 1936, could fire bursts, had a magazine for 15 rounds. And they will be absolutely right. But then, as a rule, the categorical follows: ABC turned out to be complex and unreliable, because of it it was discontinued even before the start of World War II. And this is true, but not all ...

Few people managed to see the ABC-36, so to speak, “live” and, moreover, get acquainted with its design. As a rule, our knowledge of the rifle is limited to a couple of paragraphs in Bolotin's book "Soviet Small Arms". Meanwhile, the ABC design deserves more detailed description. The ABC-36 rifle is a further development of the design of the Simonov automatic rifle mod. 1931 At that time, the design of the ABC was original, very bold, one might say "on the verge of fantasy."

Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov

Simonov automatic rifle arr. 1936 belongs to weapons systems in which the reloading mechanism is driven by powder gases vented from the bore. The shutter is locked by a vertically moving wedge. The striker-type trigger mechanism, driven by a separate mainspring located inside the bolt, allows both single and continuous fire. The switching of fire modes is carried out by the translator, who was first in front of the trigger guard.

ABC-36. Left side view

ABC-36. Right side view

The extraction of the spent cartridge case is carried out by an extractor located in the upper part of the bolt, reflection - by a spring-loaded reflector at the bottom of the receiver (box). The direction of sleeve extraction is up and forward. Cartridges are fed from a detachable double-row box magazine with a capacity of 15 rounds. The magazine attached to the rifle could be loaded with cartridges from standard rifle clips, and it can also be loaded in the usual way. At the end of the cartridges in the store, the shutter stops at the shutter delay and supports the trigger. The sector-type sight is cut at distances up to 1500 m. The rifle is equipped with an effective single-chamber muzzle brake. For reference hand-to-hand combat a bladed bayonet adjoins it. The rifle is fired without a bayonet.

In many ways, the definition of "first" can be applied to the construction of ABC. A number of technical solutions implemented in ABC had no analogues, both in domestic and world weapons practice. For the first time, a serial domestic 7.62-mm rifle received a bladed bayonet and a muzzle brake, as well as an unprecedentedly capacious general store. For the first time in world practice, the gas chamber of a rifle was located above the barrel. For the first time in the world in a weapon of this caliber, the principle of wedge locking of the bolt was implemented.

ABC has some technical features that need to be described. The main feature of ABC is the locking knot. The locking of the shutter (namely the shutter!) Is carried out by a vertically moving wedge. The wedge is a rectangular prism with a through window for the passage of the shutter and the shutter stem. In the locked position, the wedge, as it were, “supports” the bolt from below. This is a very important point, since in all publications, with the possible exception of Blagonravov's reference book, the wedge method of locking the barrel, and not the bolt, is indicated. The lowering of the wedge to disengage it from the bolt is carried out by a cocking clutch - a special part driven by a gas piston. The rise of the wedge is carried out by the stem of the shutter when rolling.

The position of the parts of the rifle with the bolt locked. The drummer is held by a sear.

The problem of fixing the bayonet on the rifle barrel was solved in an original way. The latch function is performed by a movable spring-loaded bayonet handle. The stock of the rifle was made of walnut. Some of the rifles were produced in sniper version and was completed with an optical sight VP arr. 1931 In order not to prevent the ejection of cartridge cases, an optical sight was installed near the left wall of the receiver.

ABC-36 was equipped with a detachable bladed bayonet. In the picture with a rifle, the guardian of the fonla domestic weapons VIMAIVIVS Pyotr Goreglyad

For maintenance, an accessory was attached to the ABC. In addition to the usual brush, wiping, drift and ramrod, the accessories also included a key for locking the translator, a screwdriver-key for switching the gas regulator and a ramrod extension. All accessories fit into a pencil case (except, of course, a ramrod), which is a screwdriver handle and a ramrod handle when cleaning. The cover of the case served as a muzzle pad. Such a design of packing accessories was used in our army for the first time and later became traditional. The ramrod was located to the right of the barrel and was fixed with its head in the cutout of the muzzle brake due to its own elasticity.

ABC-36 aiming block was mounted on the breech breech. The ramrod of the rifle is located on the right side of the box

The accessory also included a case for carrying a rifle. The case protects the weapon from dust, dirt and scratches on a hike, in transport - in all cases when its immediate use is not expected. In the case of the ABC, the case performed another function - it covered the rifle from prying eyes. After all, ABC was an ultra-modern model of those years, so secrecy was fully justified.

Getting ABC into production was not easy. The decision to launch the rifle in series was made in 1932, but in fact, production began only in 1934. ABC went into series without being officially adopted, which led to serious difficulties in mastering production. The difficulties were such that for the organization of production at the Izhevsk Arms Plant, a rifle designer S.G. Simonov was sent, who, for this, was forced to leave his studies at the Industrial Academy. Upon the arrival of Simonov, it turned out that the plant was completely unsuitable for the production of modern automatic weapons - both technically and organizationally. Technological discipline at the plant was very weak. For example, parts were hardened “by eye”. Parts were made with unacceptably large allowances, there was no question of any interchangeability. Only Simonov's energy and special powers, as well as the intervention of People's Commissar S. Ordzhonikidze, made it possible to get things off the ground.

In the end, the difficulties of mastering production were left behind. In 1936, the ABC rifle was officially adopted by the Red Army under the designation ABC-36 (index 56-A-225). ABC-36 was significantly different from ABC mod. 1931 In 1932, the folding needle bayonet was replaced with a detachable blade bayonet, a muzzle brake appeared.

Rifles produced before 1936 were equipped with magazines with a capacity of 10, 15 and even 20 rounds, since 1936 - only 15 rounds. The cut-off mentioned above was introduced into the design of the rifle in 1935, in 1936 its final version was installed on the rifle, and also significantly simplified version trigger mechanism. The fire mode translator has been moved to the right side part the box and began to be actuated by the latch of the checks of the receiver cover. There were differences in the shutter and other components and details.

The safety of the rifle was located at the back of the trigger guard and locked the trigger (the fuse is on in the photo)

With the adoption of the ABC-36, the Soviet Union entered the first row of countries in the world in equipping the army with the most modern small arms. The 7.62 mm Garanda Ml self-loading rifle, adopted by the US Army in the same year, was inferior to the ABC in a number of indicators.

There are a number of myths associated with ABC. The first is the bayonet-bipod, which was equipped with ABC-36. In fact, only a part of the rifles produced before the middle of 1936 was equipped with a bipod bayonet. The bipod bayonet did not justify itself, and the rifle went into the main series (1936-40) without it. Another myth. Say, ABC could replace a light machine gun and even on equal terms to resist the German single machine gun MG-34. Deep delusion. ABC-36, although an automatic rifle, but the main type of fire from it was single-shot fire. Shooting in continuous bursts was allowed only when repelling an attack, and then no more than 4 stores in a row, otherwise the rifle could fail due to overheating. The reader can evaluate the effectiveness of automatic fire from the table.

Characteristics of accuracy of fire from the ABC-36

Shooting was carried out lying down from the stop by experienced shooters in the conditions of the training ground, continuous fire - 15 rounds in a queue. In terms of accuracy of automatic fire, ABC barely reached the submachine guns of those years. So there was no question of any opposition to the ABC machine gun. At best, ABC could be considered a high-powered rifle, but not an analogue of a light machine gun.

We will try to be objective in everything. Some parts of the ABC-36 were expensive and time consuming to manufacture, especially the box. In addition, the rifle was distinguished by increased sensitivity to the quality of the steels used and their heat treatment. This directly affected the reliability of the weapon as a whole, since in order to ensure the required resource and at the same time comply with strict weight restrictions, a number of critical automation parts were made from special. steels. Nevertheless, subject to all the requirements of the TU, the rifle had a technical resource of at least 27,000 rounds, which is commensurate with the resource of a modern PKM machine gun - at least 30,000 rounds.

ABC-36 had a number of features in operation. The presence of automation led to the appearance of delays previously unknown to the ordinary soldier. These include, for example, double shots, incomplete recoils of moving parts, etc. Most of the delays were due to contamination of the gas paths or thickening of the lubricant. At the same time, not everything was thought out in terms of ease of maintenance of the rifle.

General view of parts with partial disassembly of the rifle

To remove the handguard and get to the gas chamber, it was necessary to separate the barrel from the stock. The dismantling of ABC concealed a number of surprises. For example, when taking out a rifle, it was possible to pinch the fingers of the drummer that had fallen off the self-timer (the compressed mainspring is inside the bolt!). Assembling the shutter also required a certain dexterity from the shooter. Of course, such a design of the rifle design did not contribute to the desire of the soldier to clean his weapon in a timely and thorough manner. However, these were precisely the features of operation, and not the flaws in the design of the rifle. Unfortunately, it is customary for us to “take hostility” to any feature if it leads to a break in the established order. It happened this time as well. Despite the rather cautious introduction of the rifle into the troops and the participation of the ABC in the conflicts of the pre-war period (Khalkhin-Gol, the Finnish campaign), the ABC-36 did not receive recognition among the troops. The main claims against ABC have come down to us: the rifle is unreliable, sensitive to weather conditions, and complex in design. Is it really?

The arrow shows the gas regulator

The answer is far from clear. Anyone who is familiar with the device of the "coeval" ABC-36 - with the American self-loading rifle Garanda Ml arr. 1936 - not superficially, but in detail, he will not say that our ABC is too complex a weapon. And reliability ... Here you need to consider the following factors. ABC production began in 1932-35. It was a period of formation of the domestic heavy and steel industry, precision engineering. At that time, the production of new steels, equipment, and machine tools was just being mastered in the USSR. It must be clearly understood that the technological culture of weapons production in the USSR in those years was still very far from ideal. And not only at the Izhevsk Arms Plant ... Under these conditions, it was impossible to achieve a stable quality in the manufacture of serial automatic rifles. This explains the long life of ABC prototypes, and at the same time, the premature failure of rifles from production batches. The operation of the rifle was also a significant difficulty. ABC required careful preparation, high responsibility and a certain level of technical literacy of shooters. And with literacy in a country that recently ended a chain of bloody wars, it was not easy.

The Soviet industry was rapidly gaining momentum, the output of ABC was constantly growing. If in 1934 only 106 rifles were produced, and in 1935 - 286 units, then in 1937 - already 10280 units, and in 1938 - 23401 units.

In total, until 1940, 65,800 pieces were produced. ABC. Simonov continuously improved the design of the ABC, but ... More modern samples of self-loading rifles have already appeared, simple in design and technologically advanced in manufacture. In 1940, the ABC-36 was taken out of production, freeing up capacity for the production of a new rifle - the Tokarev SVT. The ABC-36 rifle was not just a failure, it was doomed to failure. Perhaps if she had appeared later, her fate would have been different. But we, today, need to remember - ABC was still the first serial automatic rifle in a very young country. The country is learning. Learned to work. Learned to make weapons. Learned to fight. ABC has given our industry and army an invaluable asset. This is an experience. Don't forget about it.

Partial disassembly of ABC-36

1. Detach magazine

2. Check for the presence of a cartridge in the chamber

3, Remove the receiver cover lock

4. Separate the receiver cover with a return spring

5. Separate the bolt with bolt stem and striker

TTX automatic rifle ABC-36

Weight with a bayonet in a sheath, with an optical sight and a magazine filled with cartridges, kg - 5.95

Weight without a bayonet, without an optical sight and without a magazine, kg - 4.05

Store weight with 15 rounds, kg - 0.68

Bayonet weight with scabbard, kg - 0.55

The total length of the rifle without a bayonet, mm - 7260

The total length of the rifle with a bayonet, mm - 1520

Rate of fire, rds / min. – 800

Combat rate of fire: single fire, rds / min. – 20…25

short bursts, shots / min. – 40…50

continuous fire, rds / min. – 70…80

Muzzle velocity, m/s - 840

The length of the rifled part of the barrel, mm - 557

From the editor. The history of small arms knows many examples when one or another model, for whatever reason, could not fully realize all its capabilities. In each case, there are a variety of versions explaining why this happened. At the same time, even people professionally associated with weapons interpret the situation in different ways.

In 2001 and 2002, the KALASHNIKOV magazine published articles by Ruslan Chumak about domestic rifles ABC (“A Rifle Ahead of Time”) and SVT (“The Difficult Fate of SVT”). On the technical side of the articles, there are practically no questions. It is not clear just what the term "general store" means in relation to the ABC rifle magazine. But on the question of the reasons for the removal of these rifles from production, I do not consider it possible to agree with the author.

Let me remind you that Ruslan Chumak cites, in the case of ABC, the low technical and organizational level of production at the Izhevsk plant as the reasons for the withdrawal from production of the ABC rifle and the cessation of the production of the SVT rifle at the beginning of World War II (this idea was first voiced by biographer S. G. Simonov A.F. Shestakovsky in the books "Achieve the Impossible" and "Nugget") and the decline in manufacturing quality with the outbreak of war in the case of the SVT rifle. In addition, the low level of literacy of fighters who did not know how to properly operate rifles is mentioned.

In order to be able to talk about the production reasons for the unsuccessful fate of ABC and SVT, it is necessary to touch in general terms on the process of putting weapons into production and the process of mass production itself. In most cases, the production model differs significantly from the prototype that has been tested and put into service. And this is not surprising. Prototypes submitted for testing are made in the experimental workshop by highly qualified workers. The assembly and debugging of the sample from beginning to end is usually carried out by one fitter. But in this way, at best, several dozen samples can be made.

Mass production is fundamentally different from experimental. The entire process of manufacturing parts and assembling products is divided into small operations that can be performed by low and medium-skilled workers. Therefore, the number of places requiring individual adjustment should be kept to a minimum. With such an organization of labor, it is possible to achieve high productivity and, accordingly, many times, in comparison with experimental production, increase output.

But the transfer of weapons from the category of experimental to the category of mass-produced, and even more so mass-produced, requires serious design and technological development. Some parts and assemblies have to be changed in favor of more productive technology. One of the most difficult tasks for a designer is to find such solutions that, without reducing the quality of the sample, make it acceptable for production.

If the designer and technologist do not find a compromise solution, production may simply stop due to a large percentage of defects and delays in the process of debugging and testing samples. I believe that both in the case of ABC and CBT, the design was not worked out for the required production volumes. Hence the large number of adjustment operations in the ABC rifle, and a sharp decrease in the quality of the SVT during the transition to work in wartime conditions.

Citing Shestakovsky's book, Chumak writes: "The parts were made with unacceptably large allowances, there was no question of any interchangeability." The term "allowance" usually means a deliberately left stock of material on parts for subsequent processing (for example, after hardening) or fitting when assembling mechanisms. And if we take the word "allowance" in this sense, then again there are design flaws.

The difficult fate of the SVT was also largely predetermined by unsuccessful design decisions. The design of the bolt and the insufficiently massive barrel in the chamber area gave rise to the rifle’s tendency to tight cartridge case extractions, which, in turn, forced Tokarev to resort to such an “exotic” element as the Revelli grooves in the chamber. When rolling, the bolt of the rifle was pressed against the bottom of the box by the bolt frame, which also did not contribute to reliable operation, especially in difficult conditions.

The article about SVT mentions that in 1942, due to unsatisfactory accuracy of fire, the release of sniper SVT was discontinued. But the point is not only that, in terms of accuracy of fire, the sniper version of the SVT was inferior to the “three-ruler”. What is much worse, the rifle "suffered" from a serious illness - the separation of the first shot in the series, which is completely unacceptable for a sniper weapon. And this was again connected with the design solutions of the SVT rifle.

Now some comments on the issue of insufficient preparedness and literacy of the soldiers of the Red Army and the improper use of weapons. Maybe someone will not agree, but I am sure that the male population of the USSR of the pre-war period in terms of literacy was superior to the "mujahideen" of Afghanistan, as well as the fighters of numerous liberation fronts of African states and countries of Southeast Asia.

And they, as you know, have been operating without problems for many years Soviet and Chinese AKs of various modifications, PK, DShK and many other types of small arms created in wartime and post-war times. So it's not about literacy, but about the quality of the design. And I cannot agree that the ability to pinch your fingers with a striker when disassembling an ABC is “a feature of operation, not a design flaw.”

We must call a spade a spade: the inconvenience of maintenance is a design defect. Moreover, the press does not mention in the full sense the “killer” defect of ABC. If, after complete disassembly, the rifle is assembled without a locking wedge, it is quite possible to send a cartridge into the chamber and fire.

In order to imagine what will happen to the shooter when the unlocked bolt of a rifle chambered for a very powerful cartridge flies back at great speed, one does not need to have a particularly rich imagination. Thus, one of the basic rules for designing weapons is violated in ABC - the design should not allow incorrect assembly, and if this still happens, the possibility of a shot should be completely excluded.

So I don’t think it’s worth talking about the “ahead of time” ABC rifle. Even if at the end of the war, not to mention the later period, a similar model appeared, there would be no question of adopting it into service.

As for the photographs of German and Finnish soldiers given in the articles with captured ABC and SVT rifles, as well as the reference to the fact that the Germans adopted the SVT, this rather indicates a shortage of weapons in wartime conditions than the recognition of any or exceptional qualities of samples.

If you carefully look at domestic newsreel and photographs of the initial period of the war, you can see, especially among the fighters of the people's militia, small arms from almost all countries that participated in the First World War. However, in my memory, none of the foreign historians used such materials as arguments proving high combat performance, for example, a Shosh light machine gun or a Lebel rifle.

Someone might say that, having before your eyes the result of more than sixty years (if you count from the moment ABC was adopted) of the development of domestic weapons, it is easy to criticize some of the first types of automatic weapons adopted by the army. But in no way do I want to question the merits of S. G. Simonov and F. V. Tokarev in the field of creating domestic weapons.

Any experience, even if not too successful, is valuable if only because the next generation of designers has a chance not to repeat the mistakes that their predecessors learned from. It’s just that the reasons for failures must be sought primarily in the design itself and in the level of its sophistication. Estimates of weapons, even if they have not been used for a long time, must be objective. It will be much more useful for both professionals and lovers of the history of weapons.

Ruslan Chumak. In search of truth…

From the editor. Today we are publishing our author Ruslan Chumak's reply to Alexey Dragunov's letter, published in No. 5/2003. In the controversy that unfolded around the SVT and ABC rifles (Nos. 6/2001, 4/2002), two different approaches to evaluating the sample collided.

In No. 5/2003, an article by Alexei Dragunov "Soviet self-loading" was published. It is always interesting to receive feedback on your work, especially if it comes from a specialist of such a level as Alexei Dragunov. I was also pleased that there were no technical inaccuracies in my article, and also that our opinions coincided on a number of issues. Nevertheless, I will still try to insist on my point of view on some issues. I am an officer of the Armed Forces and work in the field of operation and repair of small arms and artillery weapons. It is clear that, due to the specifics of the type of activity, my approach to the analysis of the design of weapons is somewhat different from that proposed by A. Dragunov. But I want to believe that a different focus of activity will not become an obstacle in the search for truth.

ABC

First of all, I will explain the term "general store". According to the definition given in the reference book by E. A. Gorov “Mechanisms of Small Arms”, a general store is a store that can be loaded with cartridges both separately from the weapon and with the help of standard clips without disconnecting from the weapon.

A. Dragunov considers ABC comprehensively. A modern approach, but it is not justified in relation to the system of the late 20s - early 30s. The ABC rifle is a vivid example of the discrepancy between the level of technical and technological solutions and combat properties incorporated in the design of the weapon, which led to many problems in the production and operation of the rifle. Some solutions (technical capabilities) to ensure the required level of reliability and manufacturability of weapons, obvious for a later time, were absent in those years or were not yet known. The design of a number of ABC nodes was focused on the design of similar nodes magazine rifles(trigger and impact mechanism, stock design), which led to an excessive complication of the design of the rifle. The placement of the mainspring in the bolt is a very controversial decision in all respects, but the peculiarity of disassembling the ABC bolt should not be attributed to the unambiguous shortcomings of the weapon.

The "features" of the operation of individual types of small arms are a separate issue. For example, setting the trigger of a rifle mod. 1891/30 on the safety platoon, and even at low temperatures, is a serious problem. But after all, for 60 years they did not just put up with this defect - they went into battle. And if the possibility of pinching a finger with an ABC drummer is considered a serious defect, then where should the nails broken on the protrusion of the AK fuse-translator be taken? But half the world somehow puts up with this feature of AK. It’s not worth talking about the M-16 at all - its rammer and the features of disassembling the assembly have already become “the talk of the town”. Nevertheless, one of the most trained armies in the world is armed with this rifle. So in this matter everything is relative and categorical, in my opinion, is unacceptable.

As for being able to shoot with the locking wedge missing, yes, it is indeed possible. However, the wedge is simply not removed without the use of a tool, and it is much more likely that a soldier will not remove the wedge than that he will forget to install it. You can also assemble without lugs and fire a DP or DShK. This "violation" is common to almost every sample that has a locking shutter with the help of removable intermediate elements, and none of them has a lock. In addition, a complete disassembly of the rifle (which may result in the loss of the wedge) should only be carried out under the supervision of an officer or gunsmith. The latter requirement, by the way, is still valid today, including for the AK74.

Aleksey Dragunov was very scrupulous about the lack of interchangeability of parts in the ABC of the first releases, considering this unpleasant phenomenon to be a design flaw of S. G. Simonov. I did not have to deal with the production of a sample of weapons, but the experience of communicating with specialists from enterprises for the production and repair of artillery weapons, working with machine tools and drawings says: the amount of allowances depends on many factors - the qualifications of production personnel, quality, technical equipment. state and settings of equipment, etc., but not from the designer of the mechanism. As far as I know, before launching the mechanism into a series, the drawings must be processed and agreed with the technologists of the plant. And if this work, for some reason, was not done (or performed poorly), then the designer is definitely not to blame.

Dragunov also misses that the problem was also in the plant's technical staff not understanding the need for careful processing of automatic weapon parts, as well as in the poor organization of heat treatment of parts. The situation when parts for hardening are dipped into water instead of oil is unequivocally interpreted by the governing documents in force at the weapons repair arsenals as poor technological discipline. Of course, Dragunov's patriotic attitude towards his factory is well understood, but the rifle designer was not at all to blame for this fact, described by Shestakovsky. By the way, the problem of insufficiently clear organization of the production of a rifle refers exclusively to the period of development and launch of the ABC in a series. The “Service Manual” on the ABC quite clearly indicates: non-interchangeable parts are available for rifles produced only before 1936.

Well, the last. So was ABC ahead of its time? I think I'm ahead of it. In the mid-30s, the appearance in the troops of serial individual automatic weapons (in this case, an automatic rifle) was an unprecedented phenomenon. But the advanced weapon concept embodied in the ABC, unfortunately, was not supported by design solutions of the appropriate level. In this case, the idea behind the weapon was ahead of the design and technological capabilities of that time. But is this really a reason to rate weapon designs as unsatisfactory? In the early 30s, the ABC was the best automatic rifle developed by that time in our country, and possibly in the world.

SVT

Alexey Dragunov believes that the main reason for the failure of the ABC and SVT rifles is the poor quality of the weapon design and the lack of development of systems to the required production volumes. In the case of ABC, this statement is true in terms of production volumes. As for SVT, this is not the case. In the book of D. N. Bolotin “The History of Soviet Small Arms and Cartridges”, it is indicated that the most serious attention was paid to the issues of technological preparation for the production of SVT, the most modern, by that time, methods for developing those were applied. processes and technological documentation. The required production volumes of rifles at that time were well represented (for 1941, it is planned to produce 1.8 million units, 1942 - 2 million units). These are serious numbers by today's standards. Of course, the production of SVT presented a certain technical and technological difficulty. But even a high-tech AK was not always the way we know it (for example, an AK with a milled receiver) both in terms of labor intensity of manufacture and in terms of the resource of individual parts. AK led "to the pedestal" for more than 10 years. I dare to say that the SVT also had a future - if it were brought up for 10 years of peacetime. However, the "formation" of SVT took place during the war years - not best time for fine-tuning the design.

The SVT bolt group really had a drawback - wedging of moving parts during rolling. But, wedging is an organic drawback of the locking scheme with a skewed shutter, and it, to one degree or another, is characteristic of almost every system with a skewed locking element. All these systems are sensitive to work in difficult conditions. In the Degtyarev machine guns, special measures were even taken to reduce the friction of the wedged lugs against the walls of the receiver. However, this locking scheme also has undoubted advantages, it is common throughout the world.

With the outbreak of the war, the quality of the manufacture of rifles inevitably declined. But, I think, the main reason for this was not just an increase in production volumes, but a decrease in the time standards for the production of a unit of a product with the same (or less) volume of production capacities and a decrease in the personnel potential of the enterprise. TOZ, evacuated to the city of Mednogorsk, produced the first SVT at a new location 38 days after the cessation of their production in Tula. And already from January 1942, he produced 50,000 rifles a month! Only very simple weapons could retain their qualities under similar production conditions. Of course, if we take a rifle arr. 1891/30, the production of which at the Izhevsk plant for 40 years was debugged like a clock, and which the plant produced 12,000 pieces. per day, then there is no dispute, SVT (as, indeed, any other complex automatic weapon) loses to it.

Regarding the sniper SVT. I will try to remind you that in my article I did not consider it correct to introduce SVT into the army in the sniper version. Nevertheless, I believe that the sniper SVT, as a rifle for a sniper of an average level of training (and there were an overwhelming majority of them), was quite a decent model, its shortcomings were within such limits that one could put up with. The famous sniper L. Pavlichenko fought with this rifle. There are memories of front-line soldiers who were snipers in the war, testifying to the fairly decent qualities of the rifle. So, the sniper SVT was discontinued, most likely, not so much because of "intolerant" shortcomings, but because of economic considerations, such as the desire to produce more weapons at lower costs. For wartime conditions (and even more so, the heaviest losses of 1941-42), it was more profitable to give the troops three sniper rifles with manual reloading than one self-loading one, for which automation is a useful, but not the most important property. This consideration applies not only to the sniper rifle model.

Regarding the literacy of the male population of the USSR in the pre-war years. Unlike the Mujahideen and other "forest brothers" who have been fighting all their conscious lives and for whom an automatic rifle is as familiar as a ballpoint pen is for us, in the USSR of the 30s the situation was completely different. At that time, not all villages had a “light bulb of Ilyich” at all, and the tractor was by no means an ordinary phenomenon. It is no secret that in the pre-war period, some soldiers, especially from rural areas, were taught literacy in the army. But even the ability to read, write, throw a mock-up grenade, and shoot from a small-caliber rifle does not mean a potential readiness to operate sophisticated weapons. Of course, having served a couple of years with a self-loading rifle, the soldier recognized it perfectly. But it was this regular and more or less trained army that we lost in the battles of 1941. The soldiers who came to replace them did not know any other weapons, except for the “three-ruler”, DP and “maxim” (the last two samples, moreover, were available not every soldier). And they always had a reflex of fear of “this tricky thing” - I reason this way because this problem exists today - with the AN94 assault rifle. The soldiers do not understand the AN94 device, do not trust it and go into battle with proven AK74s. And as for the quality of the design of weapons: Even AKs can (though difficult) be ruined by shameless exploitation. Sometimes it doesn’t fit in my head what modern, seemingly educated soldiers in some parts are doing with their weapons! They are “landed” from a PC - but not in battle, but at firing, under the supervision of officers, with continuous fire, God knows how many cartridges with tracer bullets, so much so that the barrels bend. They compete in loading an AK by hitting the butt on the floor, use it as a bench, use the barrel of a weapon as a poker, and even (!) - shoot with a ramrod using a live cartridge. You really need to be a Kalashnikov weapon to withstand all this. Where is the SVT! I have to admit with bitterness that the shooting and technical training of our infantry soldiers has always been “limping”. Evidence of this is the memoirs of veterans, research by historians, the opinion of authoritative specialists, including employees of OAO IZHMASH (see No. 5/2002, p. 33, heading “Mail”). But the most eloquent evidence will be statistics. In 1942, the failure of weapons was due to the following reasons (in%): (System of TO and R artillery weapons. M., 1984)

- from combat damage - 50

– from natural wear and tear – 25

- from inept exploitation - 20

- from design flaws - 5.

These are very general data, but they reflect the situation with the operation of weapons in general. Of course, the percentage of weapon failure from inept operation in the Great Patriotic War was less than in the First World War (then - more than 50%), but still very large. The military experience of many generations of officers says - WITHOUT TOTAL CONTROL, it is very difficult to inspire our ordinary soldier with the importance and need to consciously protect and regularly maintain their weapons. It's easier to give him the most unpretentious weapon in the world. Which is what we currently have.

SVT was adopted by the Wehrmacht. As well as DP, PPSh, PPS. Of course, this also indicates a shortage of weapons, although the capture of a large number of enemy weapons is possible only during successful offensives, and victories and a shortage of weapons somehow do not fit well with each other. But the official adoption of the SVT by the German army meant not just picking up a weapon on the battlefield and handing it over to a soldier, or taking it from a warehouse and putting it in the hands of a militia for one battle - as we did in 1941 with “lebels” and “shoshas” . The adoption by the army of a captured type of weapons means that a system for the collection, accounting and supply of ammunition and spare parts is being developed for it, and in some cases a repair technology. To do these difficult "manipulations", the trophy sample of the weapon must be really valuable. That is why the Germans did not adopt either the French Hotchkisses and Shoshas or the Russian Maxims.

Therefore, one should not confuse the episodic use of obsolete models with the introduction of a captured, but the most modern semi-automatic rifle at that time into the armament system of the German army, which had no analogue in their army, but which the Germans, according to the memoirs of General Halder, really needed.

And in conclusion. Objectivity has always been a relative concept - it depends on where you look from. There are more than enough examples of this. How, for example, to treat the design of the APS? What is the root of his failure in the army and the subsequent success in the troops special purpose? Regarding SVT, the only indisputable fact is that at some point in the war the rifle began to give an increased percentage of delays, turned out to be unpopular with the troops, and its production was sharply reduced. And yet, if we turn to film and photographic documents, the SVT fought until the end of the war. It can be seen in the hands of soldiers both on the Kursk Bulge and in Berlin, when there was no longer any shortage of weapons. And if so, it was not such a low-quality design. The fate of a weapon, like the fate of a person, does not always depend on his personal qualities. It is also very important to appear in right time and/or in right place. And have time to improve. If this does not happen, even the most promising designs may fail. It seems that this is exactly what happened with our self-loading 30s.

Automation rifle ABC-36 works by using the energy of powder gases removed from the bore when fired. The barrel locking design implemented in the rifle made it possible, due to the optimal distribution of loads in the locking assembly, to reduce the weight of the bolt and the entire rifle.

The reloading mechanism of the ABC-36 is actuated by powder gases discharged from the bore, and for the first time the gas outlet unit with a short stroke of the gas piston was located above the barrel. Also, the “know-how” was the principle of wedge locking of the shutter, in which the locking is carried out by a vertically moving wedge, which is a rectangular prism with a through window for the passage of the shutter.

Rifle fire can be fired both by single shots and bursts. The corresponding flag-type fire translator is mounted at the rear of the trigger guard.

The rifle is also equipped with a fuse against accidental shots and a muzzle brake that absorbs a significant part of the recoil energy.

To feed the rifle with ammunition during firing, a detachable box magazine with a capacity of 15 rounds is provided.

The rifle was completed with a blade bayonet, which could be used as an additional support, for which the bayonet was rotated at an angle of 90 ° with respect to the axis of the barrel.

The AVS-36 sniper rifle differs from the standard ABC-36 self-loading rifle only in the presence of a PE optical sight and more accurate processing of the bore to obtain the required accuracy of battle.

Due to the fact that the spent cartridges are ejected from the receiver up and forward, the optical sight bracket was attached to the receiver to the left of the axis of the weapon.

The ABC-36 sniper rifle has the advantage that, thanks to the automatic reloading and cocking of the striking mechanism, the shooter can limit himself to only one movement before each shot - pulling the trigger. At the same time, he does not need to change the position of his hands, body and head, as he has to do before a shot from a conventional rifle that requires reloading a cartridge. Thus, all the attention of the shooter can be focused on conducting surveillance of the battlefield and on finding a target.

The production of the ABC-36 rifle was carried out in 1934-1939 by the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant. In total, for all the years of production, 65,800 AVS-36 rifles were produced, the number of sniper rifles produced for all years was 200 units.

Although the sector-type sight mounted on the ABC-36 rifle allowed for aimed fire at a distance of up to 1500 m, with automatic firing effective range decreased several times. This, along with the high consumption of ammunition, was the reason that, as the then People's Commissar for Armaments B. L. Vannikov recalled, I. V. Stalin demanded the creation of a self-loading rifle, automatic fire from which would be excluded, because, as he said, in combat conditions, the nervous state of the shooters pushes them to aimless continuous shooting, the irrational expenditure of a large number of cartridges.

As a result of this decision, the ABC-36 rifle was replaced in production by the Tokarev SVT-38 self-loading rifle.

However, the ABC-36 sniper rifle remained in service with Soviet snipers.

• Weapons » Sniper rifles » Russia / USSR
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