Viktor Zimin added to the "execution" list of governors. Viktor Zimin added to the "execution" list of governors of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug
Governors is the only judge in Russia whose sweater is raised under the vaults of the sports palace. It hangs in Viktor Mikhailovich's native Ryazan, reminding him of his long and glorious career. The local club takes care of the governors as best he can, in addition, he continues to travel around the country, inspecting KHL matches. His refereeing career began in 1976 and included matches of the union championship, world championships, Super Series and ended already in Russian championship. On the eve of the anniversary, a correspondent of the KHL press service spoke with the master.
I usually answer questions about how I feel: “You won’t wait,” Gubernatorov laughs. - But seriously, everything is fine, thank you. Sometimes I go out on the ice when hockey legends come to us. I go out and remember ... Although, I did not forget anything. Because, after judging for 20 years, I am still in the cage, in good shape, and continue to work for the benefit of hockey.
Surely, in addition to work, it also gives pleasure to communicate with our famous players who you know well.
Naturally. I worked at their matches when they were just starting their careers. Last week we opened a new one in Ryazan Ice Palace, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu came. Just in time for this discovery, a match was timed with the participation of hockey legends. By the way, I also inspected it, because there were three young judges, very promising guys. Good texture, skating. But the main thing is the desire to work. This is the main thing.
- You inspect KHL matches. How do you like the current championship?
Very strong and very interesting. Lots of good contact fighting. As for the judges, I have known all these guys for a very long time. Many came to us in Ryazan at one time for the annual pre-season tournament. Kostya Olenin, Lesha Ravodin, Lesha Anisimov. They ride with great pleasure. So, back to the championship and refereeing. Very good guys work for us, and lately they have grown up a lot, improved their skills. They work objectively and honestly, with knowledge of the matter. And it pleases.
- Nevertheless, in the media now there is just a shaft of criticism of refereeing ...
Probably, this comes from the fact that people do not understand the intricacies of hockey. It is clear that managers, club leaders invest a lot of money. Everyone wants to be first. But only one can become a champion. Therefore, conversations begin: “Why they gave a violation here, but not here,” and so on ... I know the price of mistakes well, because I was both a player and a referee. You can’t do without them, it’s a living organism. But I also know the main thing - our judges have no bias. The pressure on them is enormous, so the most persistent and most competent remained in the playoffs. But I can say that those who are not included in the number of referees officiating the Gagarin Cup matches are ready to work at a high level.
- Give advice to colleagues: how can they resist such pressure?
I always tell them: show character, no matter what.
In addition to the press from the outside, there were more disputes on the ice. Both players and coaches often question the referee's decision. How did you deal with it?
I agree, the controversy has become really more. The higher the player's status, the more often he tries to talk to the judge. But here is Fetisov. So what was an authoritative player, the captain of the national team. And then drove up to the judges only when allowed. And today, for any reason, they enter into controversy. It does not paint the players. Coaches also argue. I'm not saying it didn't happen in my time. Three times I fined Viktor Tikhonov, who is immensely respected by me. For interference in the actions of the arbitrator. Then we talked, recalled these cases, and everyone remained with his own opinion. But on the ice, the judge must fundamentally maintain his position. And don't swallow insults. Punish, regardless of titles and titles. If the judge is wrong, they will deal with him. First of all, the match inspector. And then now it's good technical equipment games. Any step of the referee can be examined under a microscope and make the right decision. What does the department of refereeing.
It is also frustrating that more simulations have now become. Yes, hockey is a dangerous sport. But guys, you don't play chess. I myself was a player, I know what injuries are. But to writhe and beg for a foul... When, after a player has received a large fine, the allegedly injured player goes into the next shift, this does not paint the hockey player. And the judge also gets in unpleasant situation, feels that he may have made a mistake.
You mentioned technical innovations. This playoff introduced a coach request procedure whereby some referee decisions can be overturned after review. Are these innovations correct?
This is fine. This makes it possible for coaches, players, and spectators to see the logic of the referees' decision in this or that episode and, in the end, relieves tension. Technique is a great help to referees. After all, some centimeters can sometimes affect the outcome of the match. Here, justice triumphs, everyone is happy.
- What can you wish to the arbitrators who will work for decisive matches playoffs?
I will not wish for objectivity, because I have no shadow of a doubt about their honesty and professionalism. So, good games and good work.
Moscow, November 23 - Vesti.Ekonomika. The Center for the Development of Regional Policy conducted surveys of leading experts in the field of regional policy, including journalists, public figures, political scientists, government officials, and sociologists (more than 100 experts in total).
In addition, media statistics, economic indicators, and insider information were taken into account.
The following parameters are considered as additional factors influencing the political situation in the region: "the level of anxiety", which includes actions that can lead to a threat to political stability; "elite conflicts", a low level of trust in governors can be provoked by the presence of serious internal conflicts; socio-economic factor; growth of social tension; presence of civil protest, etc.
In addition, insider information about the personality of the governor, relations with financial and industrial groups, involvement in media scandals, the level of support from federal structures, etc. The sum of these factors was taken into account when compiling the rating.
Below is a list of governors who, according to experts, may soon retire.
Alexander Berdnikov
Score : 2
Alexander Berdnikov is a Russian statesman, head of the Altai Republic, Chairman of the Government of the Altai Republic since 2006. Member of the Supreme Council of the United Russia party.
In 2012, a law was passed restoring the direct elections of the heads of regions, including the head of the Altai Republic.
Berdnikov's second term expired on January 20, 2014, and elections could only take place on a single voting day in September.
On January 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Berdnikov as acting head of the Altai Republic until he took office as the elected head.
Sergey Gaplikov
Score : 2
Sergei Gaplikov is a Russian statesman. Head of the Komi Republic since September 22, 2016 (acting temporarily since September 30, 2015).
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government Russian Federation(2010-2011), Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Chuvash Republic(2004-2010), President of the Olimpstroy Group of Companies (2011-2014).
In the summer of 2016, he was nominated as a candidate for the post of head of the Komi Republic from the United Russia party.
On September 18, 2016, he was elected head of the Komi Republic, gaining 174,567 votes out of 281,141 residents of the Komi Republic who took part in the vote (voter turnout was 40.67%): 62.17% entrusted their vote to Gaplikov.
Victor Zimin
Score : 2
Viktor Zimin is a Russian statesman and public figure. Head of the Republic of Khakassia - Chairman of the Government of the Republic of Khakassia.
Head of the Khakass regional branch of the All-Russian political party "United Russia".
On January 15, 2009, at a session of the Supreme Council of Khakassia, Viktor Zimin officially assumed the post of head of the republic.
In 2010, he also became known as the head of the republic - the chairman of the government of the republic.
At the beginning of January 2013, Zimin's term as head of the republic expired.
However, on January 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Zimin as interim head of the region until elections.
In the elections held in September 2013, Viktor Zimin won the majority of votes (63.41%) in the first round and, thus, was elected the head of Khakassia.
Alexander Karlin
Score : 2
Alexander Karlin is a Russian statesman. Head of Administration, then - Governor of the Altai Territory since August 25, 2005, member of the regional political council of the United Russia party
In the elections held on September 14, Karlin scored 72.97% and was elected governor of the region for a third 5-year term.
Aman Tuleev
Score : 2
Aman Tuleev is a Russian political and statesman. Governor of the Kemerovo Region since July 1, 1997. Member of the bureau of the Supreme Council of the United Russia party.
He has been governor for more than 20 years, according to this indicator among governors he ranks second in Russia after Evgeny Savchenko.
On April 16, 2015, due to the expiration of his term of office, Vladimir Putin appointed Tuleyev as the acting governor of the Kemerovo region until the person elected governor of the region takes office.
May 26, 2015 at the primaries of "United Russia" for the post of candidate for governor of the Kemerovo region in the Novokuznetsk Drama Theater won the majority of votes.
On September 13, 2015, he was re-elected the head of Kuzbass, gaining 96.69%. On September 22, 2015, he took office as the Governor of the Kemerovo Region.
Marina Kovtun
Score : 2
Marina Kovtun has been Governor of the Murmansk Region since April 13, 2012. Member of the bureau of the Supreme Council of the United Russia party.
By decree of the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev dated April 4, 2012, she was appointed Acting Governor of the Murmansk Region. The former head of the region, Dmitry Dmitrienko, resigned of his own free will.
On May 5, 2014, Marina Kovtun submitted an early resignation to the president in order to confirm the position of governor by elections. From that day on, she was the acting governor of the Murmansk region.
In June 2014, the Murmansk branch of United Russia nominated Kovtun as a candidate for governor in the elections on a single voting day - September 14th.
In the elections, Marina Kovtun received 64.69% of the votes. Turnout was 31%.
On October 8, 2014, the inauguration took place, and Marina Kovtun assumed the post of governor of the Murmansk region for a second term.
Georgy Poltavchenko
Score : 2
Georgy Poltavchenko - Russian politician and statesman, current governor of St. Petersburg, retired lieutenant general of the tax police.
In the early elections for the governor of St. Petersburg in 2014, Georgy Poltavchenko won 79.3% of the vote and retained his position.
As his election program, Georgy Poltavchenko used the "Strategy for Economic and Social Development of St. Petersburg until 2030" adopted in May 2014.
In December 2016, he decided to transfer St. Isaac's Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church, which caused strong public discontent and litigation.
Currently, the transfer process of the cathedral is frozen.
The main event of recent months in the lives of some representatives of the governor's corps is the famous "green folder" of the President of RussiaThe first five in the National Ranking of Governors for July-August 2017 in the group of leaders-25 were headed by Evgeny Savchenko(Belgorod region), Vladimir Yakushev(Tyumen region), Alexander Drozdenko(Leningrad region), Sergei Sobyanin(City of federal significance Moscow) and Dmitry Kobylkin(Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug). The top five has remained virtually unchanged since March 2017. The governor of the Belgorod region firmly holds the 1st place, but the governor of Yamal moved from the 2nd place to the 5th, giving way to the head of the Tyumen region. The heads of Moscow and the Leningrad region also changed places - Sobyanin went down to 4th place, Drozdenko rose to 3rd. These are the data of the rating of governors for July-August 2017, compiled by the Rating Center for Information Communications.
The heads of Russian regions of the second group are ranked from 26th to 60th. Opens the so-called group of middle peasants Alexander Karlin(Altai region), Vladimir Pecheny(Magadan Region), Maxim Reshetnikov(Perm Territory), Oleg Kozhemyako(Sakhalin region) and Yunus-bek Yevkurov(The Republic of Ingushetia). It should be noted that in May-June 2017, the leader in the group of middle peasants was Dmitry Mironov(Yaroslavl region).
The third group of 25 governors closes the rating of governors. In 61st place - Valery Radaev(Saratov region), in 62nd place - Igor Vasiliev(Kirov region), in 63rd position - Alexander Mikhailov(Kursk region), on the 64th - Arthur Parfenchikov(Republic of Karelia), in 65th place - Igor Orlov(Arhangelsk region).
At the very bottom of the National Rating of Governors for July-August 2017 (from 83rd to 85th place) is the head of the Trans-Baikal Territory Natalya Zhdanova, head of the Murmansk region Marina Kovtun and the head of the Omsk region Victor Nazarov. Note that the governor of the Trans-Baikal Territory does not leave the bottom lines of the rating for several months in a row.
The tables of the "National Rating of Governors" note the predecessors of only those heads of regions who took office during the period under study. For the format and purposes of the study, it was considered unnecessary to focus on the nuances of the status of the heads of the subjects (acting, temporarily acting, etc.).
Pavel SALIN
Political scientist, director of the Center for Political Science Research of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Relations between the federal center and the governor's corps over the past two months have shown ambiguous dynamics. On the one hand, Moscow made it clear that in the face of growing political turbulence, it does not intend to make concessions to the regions and retreat from the hard line that was chosen a little over two years ago. Indicative here is the situation with the non-renewal of the agreement on the delimitation of powers between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. Attempts by the elites of the republic to lobby for the prolongation of the document, at least in its former, purely formal form, did not find understanding with the federal government. She simply preferred to silently wait for the last date - August 11, when the contract expired. After that, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Kiriyenko, put an end to it, saying that at one time the treaty had played a positive role, but the Russian state was not built on a contractual basis.
Tensions in relations between the center and the regions are also added by the expectation of a full-fledged start of the presidential campaign in the fall. Most likely, one of its central topics will be the fight against presumptuous local officials, which means that new troubles are possible for the most insecure governors, rumors about whose lists have again begun to circulate in the political class.
On the other hand, the authorities demonstrate that they are ready to support the governors in situations where they feel insecure. A striking example of this is the complete rejection of competitive campaigns in the elections of heads of regions. The previously expected demands of the federal center to ensure the competitiveness of the electoral process unnerved regional elites(that part of them that cannot be attributed to the counter-elites), who saw this as an additional factor of destabilization against the backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation. True, in this case, there is an attempt to test the model of legitimizing the results of the 2018 presidential campaign in the next gubernatorial elections, which, judging by the current events, may be the same in dynamics as the current gubernatorial elections, unless, of course, a serious event occurs in the fall. change in the political situation.
Another positive signal to the gubernatorial corps was the statement of the same Sergei Kiriyenko in relation to the head of the Kemerovo region Aman Tuleev. The Kremlin official made it clear that there are no plans to change it until health permits. This means that Moscow's stake on "young technocrats" is not the only direction of the Kremlin's personnel policy, and old-timer governors, who can still demonstrate the ability to "hold" the region both socio-economically and politically, can count on positive prospects even in the presence of serious claims from law enforcement officers to their environment.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky
Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)
IN last years we see a serious renewal of the governor's corps. We support this, because we are always in favor of a change and for limiting the terms of office. One term of 5 years - and that's it. If you are a very good manager, then you can be sent to another region, but as far as possible from the first one. So that they do not have time to acquire different "schemes".
Therefore, we are in favor of appointing governors. So updating the management corps is easier. After all, the elections have been going on for 5 years, and we still have four Yeltsin governors left. He himself died 10 years ago, and his henchmen are still in prison, although it is high time to change them. It's time to give way to young people, those who are 35-55 years old today, and all who are older - to consultants, experts, referents, teachers.
Why else to appoint - more correctly. Russia is a huge and predominantly icy territory. Heavy production, housing maintenance, medicine, etc. - all this is uncompetitive compared to work in miniature, warm European countries. And therefore, it is necessary to manage this gigantic economy from one center, this can only be done by a centralized state. Therefore, an excess of democracy in our conditions, unfortunately, only leads to a deterioration in the quality of life.
Moreover, it is necessary to recall the history of gubernatorial elections. They were brought back to meet the protest rallies, but the system had to be secured from fringe candidates. And there were plenty of them in A Just Russia: the Gudkovs, Ponomarev and others. Theoretically, they could use the resources of the parliamentary party and go to the gubernatorial elections directly. That's why they introduced a municipal filter to cut them off. And it turned out that the elections of governors in their current form interfere with centralized management and lead to a political monopoly, no matter how paradoxical it may be. It is more difficult for an opposition candidate to run for governor than for the presidency. And political monopoly leads to corruption. How many governors have already been arrested and are in prison? Almost everything is from the same party. And many more will resign who did not draw the right conclusions. After all, many of our problems today are connected with the work of governors, and not the federal government.
If we had the appointment of governors, then it would be possible for the head of the region, who made a mistake, to be dismissed, and a representative of another party could be sent in his place. Now we have only 3 governors from the parliamentary opposition, and there should be at least 10. People can be taken from us - the Liberal Democratic Party, from the left parties, and in all regions to create a multi-party administration, as our governor Ostrovsky did in Smolensk. In the meantime, it turns out that they are taking their governors, ministers, officials out of their offices under the arms, all prisons are overcrowded, but this does not affect the situation as a whole. Because the same political force is in power, a political monopoly.
In addition, it is necessary to enlarge the regions. Why do we need splitting into 85 subjects? Where else is there such a frequent division into regions? Let's unite the neighboring subjects and we will have 35-40 provinces, no more, and Moscow appoints all the heads. Then there will be order - a little less democracy, but a powerful state.
Dmitry FETISOV
Political consultant, director of the NPR Group consulting agency
In recent months, the most important events in the life of some representatives of the governor's corps have been election campaigns and the already famous "green folder" of the president.
Nevertheless, election campaigns in the gubernatorial elections are not distinguished by liveliness. The reason for this is the lack of competition and the unwillingness of the Presidential Administration to artificially add dramaturgy to the elections. The only more or less noticeable events were the complaints of Roizman and Markhaev, who did not pass the municipal filter, and an attempt to link the ratings of the acting interim and the president during the campaign. Banners with the support of acting Vladimir Putin, which appeared this year, have not been so actively used during the gubernatorial elections for a long time, and it is not yet known how effective this move is. In the event of poor work of the acting acting and actually future elected governors, the rating of the president himself in some regions may decrease, which will not go unnoticed during the March elections.
The real excitement among the governors' corps has been caused by the "green folder" with residents' complaints about regional problems, which Putin hands to every governor he meets. For some, these meetings are painless and in working mode, for others Putin demonstrates open support (Vasiliev, Ovsyannikov), while for others, a hail of presidential criticism awaits (Levchenko). This approach, introduced personally by the president, makes it possible to clearly identify which of the heads of regions Vladimir Putin favors and whose work he is dissatisfied with. And this is already directly reflected in the positions of governors and their influence in the federal center.
Sergey RUMYANTSEV
Lawyer, Director of the Center applied research and programs (PRISP)
I would like to touch upon a topic that is close to me as a lawyer and touches on all the regions in which the elections of heads are now taking place. The fact that the role of the municipal filter in the electoral processes in our country is hypertrophied was known before. However, the events of this summer have demonstrated this especially sharply and clearly. The municipal filter in Russia appeared as a tool of containment against the backdrop of the institution of elected governors that was revived in 2012. As the speaker of the upper house of parliament, Valentina Matviyenko, recently noted, it was introduced so that “there were no random people.” One can argue for a long time on the topic - is it right to divide people into "random" and "non-random" in relation to their right to participate in elections, but Valentina Ivanovna conveyed the explanation of the reason for the emergence of the municipal filter in Russian legislation very clearly. Yes, this is exactly the “filter”, and yes, its main function is “screening out”.
The institution of the municipal filter came to us from the French electoral system - in France, a similar procedure for supporting candidates at the registration stage exists in the presidential elections in France. But there are two significant differences: 1) elected municipal officials in France have the right to support more than one candidate; in Russia, a deputy has the right to sign for only one of the candidates; 2) the number of those among whom it is possible to collect signatures in France is much higher: a candidate for the presidency of France must enlist the support of 500 elected municipal officials out of 43,000. in ¾ of the territories, these must be signatures of deputies of a level not lower than the district), and this despite the fact that the average number of deputies at the municipal level in the region is usually about 1000-1300. At the same time, we note that the vast majority of the municipal deputy corps in our country consists of deputies from United Russia.
Arguments on the topic of whether a municipal filter is good or bad is a philosophical discussion. The municipal filter today is a given. Moreover: a) established by law; b) supported by the relevant decision of the Constitutional Court.
I am sure that if they had not found such an effective lever of influence on the candidate corps, the institution of electing governors in 2012 would not have been revived. The authorities at that time needed confidence that they would be able to control the situation. Now the position of the head of the region is rather “risk” (if not “execution”), and there are noticeably fewer people who want to take this post, because the position of governor today is the maximum responsibility in the complete absence of the opportunity to use the region as an instrument of enrichment. So here on this moment it can be assumed that the authorities will go to the "weakening" of the filter mechanisms. It will probably not be canceled (the latest statements by the chairman of the CEC of the Russian Federation, Ella Pamfilova, confirm this), but such a significant change as the lifting of the ban on supporting more than one candidate by a municipal deputy is quite possible.
Such a step, I think, would be correct, both from the point of view of compliance with the principles of equality and universality of elections, which are the constitutional rights of citizens, and from the point of view of regulating political turbulence. Increasingly, it is caused by scandals with the municipal filter, as was the case in Yekaterinburg, Buryatia or Sevastopol, where candidate Viktor Rezanov defiantly handed over blank signature sheets. And everywhere the stumbling block was the rule about the impossibility of supporting more than one of the candidates.
In addition, giving deputies the right to support several candidates, in my opinion, will improve both vertical and horizontal ties in the municipal government system, especially in those regions where the filter has become a strong lever of administrative pressure from the regional authorities on mayors of cities and heads of districts, who are de facto responsible for “compliance with the standards”.
The Election Campaign Causes No Trouble Evgeny Savchenko (Belgorod region). His dominance is absolute and, by unanimous opinion, the results of the elections are a foregone conclusion. At the same time, few experts question the legitimacy of the anticipated victory: Yevgeny Stepanovich, according to available data, does indeed have significant voter support, which is not hindered even by the notorious “fatigue effect” from his long term in power. While the election campaign is rolling on knurled. The main threat to the Belgorod governor, as before, is not competitors, but the excessive zeal of his subordinates and the media “oversalting”, when voters will hear about him “from every flat iron”.
Vladimir Putin's visit to the region went quite positively for the governor, somewhat strengthening his already strong positions. The statistics published recently, from the pace of economic development of the region to the level of crime per capita, are also favorable for Yevgeny Savchenko.
Among the many policy statements of the governor, to which he apparently attaches great importance, special attention was drawn to his emotional demarche against the pharmaceutical industry (“10% good and 90% harm”) and plans to create a concern for the production of natural medicines. Evgeny Savchenko's insistent recommendation to study the materials of the blogger Varlamov, in the part that concerns the construction and improvement of housing in Finland, caused a good media reaction. It is no coincidence that experts note the exceptionally active use of the Internet in the election campaign of the governor. The plans for significant financial investments in the development of rural tourism, the production of eco-products and the improvement of services in rural areas deserved approval.
In general, the information about the possible expansion of the renovation program to the Belgorod region was received favorably.
The end of the year is a time to take stock not only in private life, but also in the political arena. The Rating Center decided to determine how effectively the governors managed their subordinate area, and how cloudless (or foggy) the future shines for them.
For compiling " National Ranking of Governors» a wide range of experts in various fields were involved, who were interviewed orally or in writing. The anonymity of the interviewees was guaranteed. The experts included such bright figures of the political Olympus as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Sergei Belokonev, Sergei Markov, Alexei Kondratiev and others.
Since 2007, the permanent ruler of Chechnya has continued to govern the territory entrusted to him, although his position has been somewhat shaken - compared to the 2016 rating, he has dropped from seventh to tenth place.
Kadyrov himself made a speech in November in the style of "I'm tired, I want to leave" and said that Chechnya now needs not soldiers, but administrators. However, he said the same thing in February 2016.
This year, Anatoly was included in the top ten governors for the first time, although he has been ruling the Kaluga region since 2000.
The creator of the “Kaluga economic miracle”, under whose leadership Kaluga moved from the usual semi-poor post-Soviet region to the category of relatively prosperous ones, believes that governors should not be moved from place to place. In his opinion, the governor should be rooted in his territory, and when the time comes to leave, he should bring up his successors in advance.
For the mere preservation of the title of president and the unique status of the republic, grateful Tatars are able to give Minnikhanov the highest rating. In addition, Rustam manages to successfully maneuver in political currents, knock money out of Moscow and use it for the benefit of the republic.
True, the governor's reputation was somewhat spoiled by the language issue - how exactly and in what proportions Russian and Tatar languages should be studied in schools.
In addition, while intensively preparing the region for the World Cup, Minnikhanov somewhat forgot about the needs ordinary people. In Kazan, the construction of a second metro line is underway, which runs through a non-residential area under the tram line. But it could be put under the sleeping area, thereby allowing many Kazan citizens to get to work and back faster. After all, championships pass, but people remain.
In 2017, Alexander's position shifted lower - if he was in fourth place, then in the current one he is only seventh. His management of the region attracted the favorable attention of Putin himself, United Russia took the most seats in the elections to the State Duma, and the reform of personnel in the administrative apparatus of the region was successful. There are even rumors that Drozdenko may take the place of the head of St. Petersburg. And although many experts are suspicious of such a possibility, these rumors reflect the strong position of the head of the Leningrad region.
The governor is also proud that the region entrusted to him has the lowest child mortality rates in the country.
Serious miscalculations in the work of Drozdenko include failure to meet the deadlines for the construction of a perinatal center in Gatchina and the collapse of a school building being built 5 kilometers from St. Petersburg. Fortunately, it has not yet been put into operation.
There were also traditional corruption scandals, but in general they were quite small and insignificant by all-Russian standards.
The past year proved to be successful for Aleksey - he moved from ninth place in the 2016 ranking to sixth. Prior to his appointment as governor of the Voronezh region, Gordeev was the Minister of Agriculture; Perhaps this factor was the key effective development agricultural area in the territory under his jurisdiction.
In addition, the region's budget is positive, roads are being repaired, major repairs are being carried out, and German entrepreneurs have begun construction of a pharmaceutical plant in the region. What more could you want?
This rosy picture is somewhat spoiled by a high-profile story about the violation of the technology for the production of engines for the Proton-M launch vehicle, which occurred at one of the Voronezh enterprises. Of course, Aleksey Vasilievich himself has nothing to do with the technological process, but history has negatively affected the image of the region he leads.
Former adjutant of Putin and permanent goalkeeper V hockey games The Night League generally had a favourable year. Interestingly, for the first time in 15 years, he was not appointed to Tula "from above", but received his place after the elections and immediately set about developing the region.
The implementation of a federal project for the construction of the Moscow-Tula highway has begun, a special economic zone has been created, which, in theory, should help with the employment of the population, and a children's technopark has been opened in Tula.
According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dyumin is a possible successor to Putin in the 2018 elections. Whether this is so, we will see in a few months.
Many governors can only dream of fourth place in the ranking, but for Sobyanin it became a sign that all is not well in the Moscow kingdom. A wave of indignation among Muscovites was caused by regular accidents (in summer Moscow is flooded, in winter it freezes due to problems on the heating main) and Sobyanin's remodels. Perhaps they were carried out with the best intentions (and not to cut the budget), but it turned out, as always, rudely and with shortcomings.
However, the Moscow mayor is still a very influential figure in the political arena. Expensive programs initiated by him periodically receive support from Vladimir Putin, and the elections of deputies of the capital's municipal districts were quite successful for Sobyanin.
Information from the Yamalo-Nenets District is contradictory. On the one hand, this is a rather favorable region with high salaries. Federal projects are being successfully implemented (new oil and gas pipelines are being built, and an efficient transport network is being established).
On the other hand, the problem of fires may negatively affect Dmitry's rating in the future. In the summer, his forests are burning (and even the introduction of an emergency message could not help put them out with the least losses), then his wooden houses of Yakutsk are burning (in some cases, one can speak with confidence about arson). Well, as usual, they steal, sir.
Despite these troubles, Kobylkin has big plans for 2018. He intends to draw up a black list of employers who irregularly pay shift workers. Pleasant changes await the wives of reindeer herders, they will receive a salary for household chores.
Although outwardly the year went well for Yevgeny, experts are sure that this is not for long. Although Putin himself positively assessed his speech at a meeting of federal politicians in Moscow (it is worth noting that Savchenko was one of the few allowed to the microphone), however, the growing contradictions among local authorities may threaten Savchenko with the loss of his chair. However, Eugene himself directly says that this term is the last for him, and is looking for a successor. And since this region is important for many federal players, it is unlikely that the search for a suitable successor will go smoothly and smoothly.
He has been in the chair of the head of the Belgorod region since 1993, this is a very long time, and experts believe that the peak of Savchenko's political career has already been passed.
The leader in the "National Rating of Governors" was the head of the Tyumen region, Vladimir Yakushev. The first place was not a surprise for him - for almost the whole year he was in the top three.
The secret of his success lies in the effective management of the region; from a raw material appendage, it is gradually turning into a comfortable place to live. The governor pays more attention to the construction of transport infrastructure and the development of the manufacturing industry. There are few people who are dissatisfied in the region - except perhaps the inhabitants of Tobolsk, who already once a year have a breakthrough in hot water pipes.
Full list (Table)
| Rating | Governor | The subject of the Russian Federation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Yakushev Vladimir Vladimirovich | Tyumen region |
| 2 | SAVCHENKO Evgeniy Stepanovich | Belgorod region |
| 3 | KOBYLKIN Dmitry Nikolaevich | Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
| 4 | SOBBYANIN Sergei Semyonovich | City of federal significance Moscow |
| 5 | Dyumin Alexey Gennadievich | Tula region |
| 6 | GORDEEV Alexey Vasilievich | Voronezh region |
| 7 | DROZDENKO Alexander Yurievich | Leningrad region |
| 8 | MINNIKHANOV Rustam Nurgalievich | Republic of Tatarstan |
| 9 | ARTAMONOV Anatoly Dmitrievich | Kaluga region |
| 10 | Kadyrov Ramzan Akhmatovich | Chechen Republic |
| 11 | Poltavchenko Georgy Sergeevich | City of federal significance St. Petersburg |
| 12 | KHAMITOV Rustem Zakievich | Republic of Bashkortostan |
| 13 | KONDRATIEV Veniamin Ivanovich | Krasnodar region |
| 14 | ILYUKHIN Vladimir Ivanovich | Kamchatka Krai |
| 15 | AKSENOV Sergey Valerievich | Republic of Crimea |
| 16 | VOLKOV Vladimir Dmitrievich | The Republic of Mordovia |
| 17 | MOROZOV Sergey Ivanovich | Ulyanovsk region |
| 18 | RESHETNIKOV Maxim Gennadievich from 02/06/2017. Replaced V.F.Basargin | Perm region |
| 19 | KOMAROVA Natalya Vladimirovna | Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra |
| 20 | NIKITIN Alexander Valerievich | Tambov Region |
| 21 | GOLUBEV Vasily Yurievich | Rostov region |
| 22 | SHPORT Vyacheslav Ivanovich | Khabarovsk region |
| 23 | Karlin Alexander Bogdanovich | Altai region |
| 24 | BAKE Vladimir Petrovich | Magadan Region |
| 25 | KUYVASHEV Evgeny Vladimirovich | Sverdlovsk region |
| 26 | TSYBULSKY Alexander Vitalievich since 09/28/2017. Replaced I.V. Koshin | Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
| 27 | NIKITIN Andrey Sergeevich from 02/13/2017. Replaced S.G. Mitin | Novgorod region |
| 28 | MIRONOV Dmitry Yurievich | Yaroslavl region |
| 29 | VLADIMIROV Vladimir Vladimirovich | Stavropol region |
| 30 | KUVSHINNIKOV Oleg Alexandrovich | Vologda Region |
| 31 | KOPIN Roman Valentinovich | Chukotka Autonomous Okrug |
| 32 | YEVKUROV Yunus-bek Bamatgireevich | The Republic of Ingushetia |
| 33 | KOROLEV Oleg Petrovich | Lipetsk region |
| 34 | VASILIEV Vladimir Abdualievich from 03.10.2017. Replaced R. G. Abdulatipov | The Republic of Dagestan |
| 35 | KOZHEMIAKO Oleg Nikolaevich | Sakhalin region |
| 36 | VOROBYOV Andrey Yurievich | Moscow region |
| 37 | RUDENYA Igor Mikhailovich | Tver region |
| 38 | ZHVACHKIN Sergey Anatolievich | Tomsk region |
| 39 | SITNIKOV Sergei Konstantinovich | Kostroma region |
| 40 | IGNATIEV Mikhail Vasilievich | Chuvash Republic |
| 41 | BELOZERTSEV Ivan Alexandrovich | Penza region |
| 42 | GAPLIKOV Sergei Anatolievich | Komi Republic |
| 43 | ALIHANOV Anton Andreevich | Kaliningrad region |
| 44 | VOSKRESENSKY Stanislav Sergeevich since 10.10.2017. Replaced P.A. Konkov | Ivanovo region |
| 45 | BERG Yuri Alexandrovich | Orenburg region |
| 46 | USS Alexander Viktorovich since 09/29/2017. Replaced V.A. Tolokonsky | Krasnoyarsk region |
| 47 | TRAVNIKOV Andrey Aleksandrovich from 06.10.2017. Replaced V.F. Gorodetsky | Novosibirsk region |
| 48 | EVSTIFEEEV Alexander Alexandrovich from 04/06/2017. Replaced L.I. Markelov | Mari El Republic |
| 49 | OSTROVSKY Alexey Vladimirovich | Smolensk region |
| 50 | BOGOMAZ Alexander Vasilievich | Bryansk region |
| 51 | BRECHALOV Alexander Vladimirovich from 04.04.2017. Replaced A.V. Solovyov | Udmurt republic |
| 52 | TEMREZOV Rashid Borispievich | Karachay-Cherkess Republic |
| 53 | NIKITIN Gleb Sergeevich since 09/26/2017. Replaced V.P. Shantsev | Nizhny Novgorod Region |
| 54 | ORLOVA Svetlana Yurievna | Vladimir region |
| 55 | Kokov Yury Alexandrovich | Kabardino-Balkarian Republic |
| 56 | AZAROV Dmitry Igorevich since 25.09.2017. Replaced N.I. Merkushkin | Samara Region |
| 57 | Vasiliev Igor Vladimirovich | Kirov region |
| 58 | DUBROVSKII Boris Alexandrovich | Chelyabinsk region |
| 59 | RADAEV Valery Vasilievich | Saratov region |
| 60 | LYUBIMOV Nikolai Viktorovich from 02/14/2017. Replaced O.I.Kovalev | Ryazan Oblast |
| 61 | OVSYANNIKOV Dmitry Vladimirovich | City of federal significance Sevastopol |
| 62 | KLYCHKOV Andrey Evgenievich since 05.10.2017. Replaced V.V. Potomsky | Oryol Region |
| 63 | ZHILKIN Alexander Alexandrovich | Astrakhan region |
| 64 | BURKOV Alexander Leonidovich from 09.10. 2017. Replaced V.I. Nazarov | Omsk region |
| 65 | TSYDENOV Alexey Sambuevich from 02/07/2017. Replaced V.V. Nagovitsyn | The Republic of Buryatia |
| 66 | TARASENKO Andrey Vladimirovich from 04.10.2017. Replaced V.V. Miklushevsky | Primorsky Krai |
| 67 | MIKHAILOV Alexander Nikolaevich | Kursk region |
| 68 | KUMPILOV Murat Karalbievich since 01/12/2017. Replaced A.K. Tkhakushinov | Republic of Adygea |
| 69 | ORLOV Igor Anatolievich | Arhangelsk region |
| 70 | KOKORIN Alexey Gennadievich | Kurgan region |
| 71 | TULEEV Aman Gumirovich | Kemerovo region |
| 72 | BOCHAROV Andrey Ivanovich | Volgograd region |
| 73 | VEDERNIKOV Mikhail Yurievich since 12.10.2017. Replaced A.A. Turchak | Pskov region |
| 74 | KOZLOV Alexander Alexandrovich | Amur region |
| 75 | KARA-OOL Sholban Valerievich | Tyva Republic |
| 76 | LEVCHENKO Sergey Georgievich | Irkutsk region |
| 77 | PARFENCHIKOV Artur Olegovich since 02/15/2017. Replaced A.P. Khudilainen | Republic of Karelia |
| 78 | ZHDANOVA Natalya Nikolaevna | Transbaikal region |
| 79 | ORLOV Alexey Maratovich | Republic of Kalmykia |
| 80 | LEVINTAL Alexander Borisovich | Jewish Autonomous Region |
| 81 | BORISOV Egor Afanasyevich | The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) |
| 82 | BITAROV Vyacheslav Zelimkhanovich | Republic of North Ossetia-Alania |
| 83 | KOVTUN Marina Vasilievna | Murmansk region |
| 84 | BERDNIKOV Alexander Vasilievich | Altai Republic |
| 85 | ZIMIN Viktor Mikhailovich | The Republic of Khakassia |
The outgoing 2017 brought the most serious reshuffles in the governor's corps in the entire history of Vladimir Putin's rule. And, as experts note, most of the new governors come from federal structures. Previously, the trend was the opposite, the governors changed their seats to the post of minister or went to a promotion in the federal center. Aman Tuleev remains the only unshakable governor. Whether the appointment of “young technocrats”, as the new governors were dubbed, will benefit the Russian regions, especially in the context of the economic and social crisis, the year 2018 will show.
12.12.2016
Seventeenth rating of political survival of governors
The Minchenko Consulting Communications Holding and the Petersburg Politics Foundation present the 17th edition of the Governors' Political Survivability Rating
The rating has been published since 2007. It assesses the probability of retaining the current heads of regions in office over the next year on a 5-point scale (where 5 is the maximum score, 1 is the minimum).
Since the publication of the previous rating on November 26, 2015, 2 out of 3 governors with a score of "2" have been replaced - Vladimir Gruzdev (Tula region) and Andrey Shevelev (Tver region). In addition, Sergei Yastrebov (3rd, Yaroslavl region), Konstantin Ilkovsky (3rd, Transbaikal Territory), Nikita Belykh (4th, Kirov region) lost their posts. For the post of plenipotentiary in the North-West federal district was translated by Nikolai Tsukanov (4, Kaliningrad region). In February 2016, the head of North Ossetia, Tamerlan Aguzarov, died (score 4-, in the comments to the Rating, the authors pointed to health problems).
Contrary to popular expectations, the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation did not become a key test for the political survival of governors. Since the federal government is trying to build a new agenda for the next presidential term, which directly affects personnel policy, the electoral results obtained during the elections, as well as the recent passage through the elections, are not a guarantee of retention in office. From the point of view of the consequences of the elections for the fate of governors, it is not the specific percentages and the number of elected deputies of different levels that are more significant, but the impact of the campaign on intra-elite balances in the regions and socio-political consequences (including the level of satisfaction individual groups of the population by their results).
In the meantime, other criteria that affect hardware survival are coming to the fore. Namely:
Technical - due to the need to make decisions on governors whose term of office is coming to an end. In 2017, we are talking about the heads of Adygea, Buryatia, Karelia, Mordovia, Perm Territory, Saratov, Sverdlovsk regions. By different reasons they could not or did not want to achieve early elections in the region, which casts doubt on the electoral potential of most of them.
Symbolic - associated with the possible desire of the new leadership of the Presidential Administration to demonstrate their political capabilities and realize their regional level intentions to restyle domestic political approaches. As a result, regions historically important for the Center (Nizhny Novgorod region), as well as heads of territories around which a negative media trail has been created in recent years (Samara region, Pskov region) fall into the risk zone. In addition, intrigue is possible around the significance of the gubernatorial elections themselves. Signals received in early December about a possible division of governors into three “lists”, taking into account the results of their work, testify to the preservation of the previous practice of “pre-election” resolution of key personnel issues. At the same time, there is room for maneuver here. The approaching presidential elections (which, judging by the media leaks, are planned to be held with a higher turnout and political mobilization) may motivate the federal government to demonstrate strong steps both in the resignation of the heads of regions, and in stimulating the brightness and competitiveness of gubernatorial campaigns, allowing until the fall of 2017 fill the agenda with bright regional cases (the Sverdlovsk region could be a recognizable example for a wide audience). As an interesting move, the appointment of technical acting governors can be used so that the governor, whose term of office has expired, is forced to take part in the elections on a common basis. It is also possible to raise the question of the meaningfulness of the practice of granting governorships to representatives of opposition parties (Oryol, Smolensk regions) - the constitutional majority of United Russia reduces the need for this. "Fair Russia" has already lost such a vacancy, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has demonstrated the ability to achieve the victory of its candidates in direct elections.
Image - tied to the current ratings of support for the current heads of regions. The limiter here is the lack of publicity and public expertise of currently ongoing closed studies, as well as sometimes hard-to-explain sharp jumps in the level of support for the heads of regions in sociological research.
Statistical - proceeding from the declared priorities of strengthening attention to the economic results of the work of the heads of regions. In the Appendix, we have attempted to summarize current economic statistics. Taking into account the incomparability of the potentials of the regions, the focus is on data on the dynamics for the past year. The data obtained only partly overlap with the existing ideas about the effectiveness of the political systems existing in the regions.
career - dictated by the expansion of the practice of transferring governors to federal positions, which often cannot be unambiguously interpreted as promotion or demotion (N. Tsukanov, E. Zinichev).
"Law Enforcement" - taking into account the effectiveness of the practice of replacing heads of regions on "anti-corruption" grounds (Komi, Kirov region, Sakhalin) and a series of attacks on them with the help of criminal cases against deputy governors and members of regional governments. This line can develop autonomously, without direct dependence on the results of the work of governors in other areas. The activity of law enforcement officers meets with a different attitude of the heads of the regions - from the open solidarity of the governor with the suspects (Kemerovo region) to self-elimination from the problem (Chelyabinsk region).
The reduction in distributed resources intensifies competition for richer regions, while the anti-corruption activity of law enforcement agencies makes even lower the motivation of regional and federal politicians to fight for posts in depressed territories.
Region |
Chapter |
Rating (on a 5-point scale, in brackets - rating in the previous rating) |
Strengths |
Weak sides |
Starting year at the head of the region |
End of term |
|
Adygea |
Aslan Tkhakushinov |
It is possible to maintain stability in the region at an acceptable level in comparison with the “Middle Caucasian” level. Competitors do not show high public activity, and the abolition of direct elections makes it easier to lobby for the extension of powers behind the scenes without reference to current ratings. |
The reverse side of the cancellation of direct elections may be the non-transparency of the decision on the candidacy of the head, including for the current republican authorities. The close term of office requires the federal government to make a prompt decision, which, given the relative peripherality of the republic for the Center, can be spontaneous. |
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|
Altai Republic |
Alexander Berdnikov |
He is one of the champions in political survival. Although not a full-fledged leader of public opinion, good economic indicators (including the development of tourism), as well as the development of a special VIP tourism sector, facilitate communication with the country's top leaders and present the results of their work. |
The attitude within the elites towards the figure of the head remains very restrained. Although A. Berdnikov won direct elections, it cost serious efforts and did not give him a great political advantage. |
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|
Bashkortostan |
Rustem Khamitov |
On the whole, he maintained socio-political and economic stability in the traditionally significant region, avoiding serious excesses, including in interethnic relations. |
The change in the ownership of Bashneft creates budgetary risks and at the same time makes the republic one of the priority territories for Rosneft. In this regard, the theses about the managerial weakness of the head, a decrease in lobbying weight, insufficient authority among local elites, violations in the elections to the State Duma, and the loss of energy that arose with the replacement of M. Rakhimov can be updated. |
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|
Buryatia |
Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn |
The republic has remained relatively peripheral to the federal government for many years, and the activity of lobbyists claiming control over the republic is low. In addition, it is possible to avoid resonant conflicts in interethnic relations. |
Numerous conflicts with local elites will be in the spotlight due to the need to make a personnel decision due to the end of the term of office. |
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|
Dagestan |
Ramazan Abdulatipov |
After the change of power in the republic, it was possible to reduce terrorist activity and the intensity of counter-terrorist operations. At the same time, in situations significant for the Center, he did not interfere with the actions of federal law enforcement agencies. |
In the event of an aggravation of the situation, the thesis of insufficient controllability, incomplete readiness to build complex inter-clan and inter-ethnic balances can be revived. Also, the question of power in the republic may become a projection of the alignment of forces between federal business groups that have interests in Dagestan (S. Kerimov, Z. Magomedov). In addition, there is an increase in the public activity of M. Magomedov, who previously held the post of head of the republic. |
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|
Ingushetia |
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov |
Significance of a counterbalance to R. Kadyrov in the North Caucasus, which implements an alternative Chechen model of building a socio-political balance. |
It was not possible to overcome the problem of the lack of socio-economic self-sufficiency of the republic. Criticism of nepotism in power by the opposition. |
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|
Kabardino-Balkaria |
Yuri Kokov |
Against the background of relative stability, the federal center has no reason to actively get involved in the situation inside the republic and take responsibility for a serious change in the balance of power. |
Natives of the republic continue to appear periodically in conflicts around illegal armed groups. |
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|
Kalmykia |
Alexey Orlov |
Allows the federal government not to get involved in the intra-republican situation, avoiding a serious aggravation of the lines of political tension. |
Due to the peripheral position of the republic, the thesis of a deficit of positive dynamics can always be presented as a counterargument. |
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|
Karachay-Cherkessia |
Rashid Temrezov |
Recent reappointment against the background of the ability to position himself as a "modern" manager. |
The Federal Center is weakly involved in the intra-republican situation, however, any violation of the inter-ethnic and inter-clan balance in a republic that is complex from the point of view of national relations and an elite configuration may prompt a rethinking of the results of the policy of recent years. |
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|
Karelia |
Alexander Khudilainen |
He managed to neutralize most of the opponents who could not convert ratings into positions of power. Able to mobilize not only political, but also power resources. Contrary to forecasts, he campaigned for elections to the State Duma relatively easily. |
As the end of the term approaches, there is a shortage of positive arguments in favor of its extension. The final decision will be determined to a greater extent by the position and alignment of forces of the federal lobbying groups, and not by the situation in the republic itself. |
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|
Komi |
Sergey Gaplikov |
Seeks to maintain the effect of a federal appointee who has taken on the "heavy legacy" of the previous leadership. He was able to reduce the influence of a number of business groups and, if necessary, name them “culprits” in the event of a deterioration in the economic or infrastructural situation. |
The “Gaiser case” paralyzed the system of government that existed in the republic, and the continuation of a series of criminal cases increased the “fear factor” among the top and middle management. Building a new managerial configuration to replace the destroyed one is still at the starting stage. |
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|
Mari El |
Leonid Markelov |
Demonstrated the ability to win in direct elections despite high anti-rating and electoral fatigue. In some sub-sectors of the economy, there is an improvement in indicators due to an increase in defense orders. For possible external competitors, the republic remains an unattractive asset. |
Re-election for a new term came with a creak. In addition, the thesis about the gradual loss of connection between the head of the republic and reality is being steadily promoted. |
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|
Mordovia |
Vladimir Volkov |
Social and political stability is preserved in the republic. Preparations for the 2018 World Cup remain one of the priorities and, at the same time, drivers of infrastructure development. The gradual distancing of the current elites from N. Merkushkin reduces the risks that may arise if the Samara governor is replaced. |
V.Volkov refrained from attempts to initiate early direct elections of the head of the republic, which creates intrigue on the eve of the end of his term. A problem for the region remains a high level of debt burden (although, according to a number of experts, we are talking mainly about budget loans, which the federal center informally promised to restructure). |
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|
Sakha |
Egor Borisov |
Leads a self-sufficient region that provides favorable economic statistics and does not form a negative agenda for federal level. Absence of claims from the federal Center. Support from Alrosa. |
Like any closed administrative system, the administrative system of the republic remains vulnerable to criticism, including for rigidity and elements of ethnocracy. Another problem for E.Borisov was the uncontested nomination of one of the key opponents to the State Duma - F.Tumusov. Additional uncertainty may be created by the change of the federal curator of Alrosa. |
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|
North Ossetia |
Vyacheslav Bitarov |
Retains carte blanche by recently taking office. |
Personnel decisions on North Ossetia have been made quite chaotic lately and have not been able to overcome the existing split in the republic's elites. |
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|
Tatarstan |
Rustam Minnikhanov |
The republic is considered one of the "exemplary" regions in terms of both economy and political manageability. This is supported by strong lobbying positions, as well as the unwillingness of the Center to play its own game in republican politics. In addition, in the Muslim world, Minnikhanov is able to partially balance the activity of R. Kadyrov and get involved in important diplomatic issues (including relations with Turkey and other Turkic countries), is an element of balance within the Muslim clergy of Russia. |
Some of the experts point to a disproportion between the politically independent position of the republic and the relatively weak interest in politics on the part of R. Minnikhanov, who prefers to concentrate more on economic issues. At the same time, the republic is not protected from outbursts of irritation on the part of the federal elites due to its emphasized autonomy, as well as the periodic promotion of high-profile initiatives (for example, the extension of a new agreement on the delimitation of powers with the federal center). |
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|
Tuva |
Sholban Kara-ool |
Recently won the election of the head of the republic. Support for S. Shoigu remains a strong point, whose positions in Siberia after the appointment of S. Menyaylo as plenipotentiary have strengthened. |
The Republic remains a non-self-sufficient region with a weak economy, dependence on the federal budget and a high potential for aggravating interethnic tensions. |
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|
Udmurtia |
Alexander Solovyov |
He managed to avoid weakening the administrative system in the republic, whose position in the economy is improving due to the growth in defense orders. |
The results of the work remain little known at the federal level, where there is no clear idea of the degree of success of the head. |
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|
Khakassia |
Victor Zimin |
He knows the situation in the republic well, relying on the support of the business groups represented here, as well as federal political allies. |
In recent years, it has often come under attack - including in connection with anti-corruption investigations and the growth of budget debts. |
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|
Chechnya |
Ramzan Kadyrov |
He is positioned as an emphatically non-alternative figure with record lobbying opportunities, thanks to which he managed to keep direct elections of the head and prevent budget cuts. |
The reverse side of the public style of behavior and lobbying successes is the accumulation of conflict potential in relations with federal agencies. At the same time, the federal authorities often do not have the opportunity to assess the real level of stability in the republic and the strength of the created administrative structure. |
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|
Chuvashia |
Mikhail Ignatiev |
He managed to "sit out" several attacks from opponents and contenders for the post of head of the republic, avoiding open involvement in public conflicts. |
Did not create a reputation as a strong manager with a strong success story. |
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|
Altai region |
Alexander Karlin |
He managed to harmonize relations with key business groups, prevent the emergence of strong opponents, and stabilize the situation in Rubtsovsk. |
Relatively low popularity and an emphasized rigid management style increase the number of opponents and make it a target for criticism. |
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|
Transbaikal region |
Natalya Zhdanova |
4 (3) |
Recently won the election using the resource of federal support. |
The arrival of the governor is regarded by many as accidental. Opportunities to bring the region out of the historically depressed economic situation are not yet obvious. |
||
|
Kamchatka Krai |
Vladimir Ilyukhin |
Managed to avoid the formation of a negative agenda. |
Like the neighboring chapters, it remains a hostage between the proclaimed priorities for the development of the Far East and the hardly obvious results of this policy. |
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|
Krasnodar region |
Veniamin Kondratiev |
Gradually moved to the formation of his own management team. He managed to keep the attention of the federal authorities to the development of the region - including in connection with the holding of the World Cup. |
Critics point to a gradual decline in political controllability, periodic bursts of social discontent, the gradual formation of an opposing pole of influence around A. Tkachev, the governor’s dependence on relationships between large federal departments, as well as the threat of a decrease in the Center’s interest in investing in tourist facilities in the region due to the priority development of Crimea . |
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|
Krasnoyarsk region |
Victor Tolokonsky |
Despite the skepticism that exists in the region regarding the political possibilities of the governor, he managed to defeat the supporters of A. Bykov during the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Balanced relations with key business groups and a constructive dialogue with the traditionally influential AP also play in favor of the governor. |
It still poorly fits into the local mentality, remaining little understood by both citizens and elites, who are used to building complex combinations. Lobbying opportunities at the federal level remain unobvious. Risks are possible in connection with the forthcoming indirect elections of the mayor of Krasnoyarsk. |
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|
Perm region |
Victor Basargin |
The economic indicators of the region remain favorable, and the autumn elections made it possible to weaken the position of intra-elite opponents. Maintaining control over the regional parliament has increased the likelihood that by the time of the elections, opponents will not come at their peak, and a broad anti-governor coalition will not be created. |
The second change of the political team during the year gives the impression of a lack of a clear strategy. As the end of his powers approaches, there will be attempts to update the topics of weak political control, disorganization of management, an intra-elite split, and numerous criminal cases against employees. The power structures ambiguously perceive the alliance of the governor with the Perm city group. |
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|
Primorsky Krai |
Vladimir Miklushevsky |
Thanks to the successful holding of major events and forums, he created for the region the image of a "showcase" of Russia's policy in the Far East. The arrest of the mayor of Vladivostok, I. Pushkarev, weakened the position of intra-elite opponents. |
The arrest of I. Pushkarev increased the level of managerial disorganization and increased the risks associated with the active participation of law enforcement agencies in the political life of the region. A risk factor could be the lack of consensus about the success of the governor's work in office. |
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|
Stavropol region |
Vladimir Vladimirov |
Managed to break the tradition of frequent replacement of governors in the region. The economic indicators of the region are generally favorable, the overall level of depression among the population has been slightly reduced. |
The problem of economic and other expansion from neighboring regions has not been resolved and continues to worsen. |
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|
Khabarovsk region |
Vyacheslav Shport |
He secured his position by minimizing the negative agenda and creating expectations from the region in the context of the development of oil and gas and defense projects. |
Problems persist in relations both with the embassy and with the authorities of Khabarovsk. This is superimposed by a deficit of generally recognized achievements and a general accumulation of fatigue. |
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|
Amur region |
Alexander Kozlov |
Despite the random nature of the appointment, he managed to repulse the first attacks on himself and begin attempts to build his own configuration. |
There is an almost unsolvable problem of non-winning positioning in comparison with O. Kozhemyako's predecessor. The lack of personal popularity is superimposed by weak positions in the elites and vulnerability to attacks by opposition parties. |
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|
Arhangelsk region |
Igor Orlov |
He managed to "hold out" in the governor's post for a long time - also due to the passivity of his competitors and the absence of a consensus candidate to replace him. |
The weakening of the lobbying potential at the federal level may become an impetus for another escalation of conflict in the political life of the region. |
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|
Astrakhan region |
Alexander Zhilkin |
Political longevity made it possible to develop significant ties (including through the organization of VIP tourism), as well as to position the region as an “outpost” of Russia on the border with the Muslim world. |
The general accumulation of elite and electoral fatigue is accompanied by a deterioration in the budgetary situation. |
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|
Belgorod region |
Evgeny Savchenko |
Developed a reputation as an effective manager and political long-liver, creating a scheme of tough political management and profitably using the position of the region bordering Ukraine and the topic of import substitution in agriculture. |
Assessing the real strength of the political regime (including the prospects for opposition and general electoral and elite fatigue) is difficult due to the fact that the regional political system last faced stressful challenges in 1999. The difficult debt situation also plays a minus for the regional authorities. |
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|
Bryansk region |
Alexander Bogomaz |
Against the background of corruption scandals of the past years, he created a reputation as an "inconspicuous" region, while simultaneously squeezing out the previous elites thanks to a criminal case against his predecessor. |
The tasks of presenting achievements and managerial competencies remain unresolved today. |
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|
Vladimir region |
Svetlana Orlova |
It was able to break down the external resistance of the regional and municipal elites, while at the same time raising public expectations from the actions of the authorities. |
The problems of "accepting" the governor's managerial style have not been completely resolved, and public hyperactivity often causes irritation and irony both within the region and among federal observers. |
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|
Volgograd region |
Andrey Bocharov |
He was able to reduce the influence of law enforcement agencies on the political life of the region and formed a pool of single-mandate members in the State Duma. Undertook a series of steps to attract investment. |
The problems of general social depression and intra-elite disagreements remain unresolved. Some of the governor's steps are vulnerable to conflicting and scandalous interpretations. |
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|
Vologda Region |
Oleg Kuvshinnikov |
Demonstrated the ability to balance between the solution of current economic problems and interaction with key donors of the regional budget. Strengthened positions in the regional center. |
The deterioration of the socio-economic situation has not been overcome; conflicts with municipalities periodically take place. |
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|
Voronezh region |
Alexey Gordeev |
4-/4 (5-) |
He is one of the most influential heads of regions at the federal level. Extensive elite connections make it possible to ignore local excesses and neutralize the actions of opponents. |
Elections to the State Duma were held in conflict, and the struggle for the abolition of direct elections of the mayor of Voronezh, which began after them, actualized intra-elite contradictions and worsened the media background. |
||
|
Ivanovo region |
Pavel Konkov |
Support from M.Me. The relative importance of the region for the federal government, taking into account the "plessky" factor. |
The region is one of the champions in criminal cases against representatives of the administrative elite. |
|||
|
Irkutsk region |
Sergei Levchenko |
It retains the symbolically significant status of a "model" politician, personifying the competitiveness of gubernatorial elections. Built relationships with leading business groups, avoiding exacerbation of relations with the federal center. |
The main risk factors are aggravated relations with municipalities and conflicts within the team. |
|||
|
Kaliningrad region |
Anton Alikhanov |
4 (4) |
Against the background of several decrees on the appointment of N. Tsukanov as the acting head of the region in 2015 and the short duration of the governorship of E. Zinichev, the federal government has a request for certainty with the person of the head of the region. |
The problems associated with weak rootedness in the region, as well as the need for electoral ratings and managerial experience, have not been overcome. |
||
|
Kaluga region |
Anatoly Artamonov |
Despite the negative conjuncture, the effect of the reputation gained in previous years as an effective manager and author of the "economic miracle" remains. |
The decline in investment-intensive industries and the lack of positive dynamics in the automotive industry call into question the reputation of an “investment innovator” and update the topic of the accumulation of electoral fatigue. |
|||
|
Kemerovo region |
Aman Tuleev |
He demonstrated a tough attitude to resist "anti-corruption" attacks on the regional administration. He put himself in a position where he is not ready to write a letter of resignation, and dismissal from office “out of confidence” remains unlikely for the federal government for political and psychological reasons. |
Became the target of attacks by law enforcement agencies and the beginning of attempts to design a "post-Tuleev" configuration of forces that could make friction between the governor and key business groups more visible. |
|||
|
Kirov region |
Igor Vasiliev |
4 (4-) |
Recent importance, coupled with interactions with law enforcement and experience at the federal level, creates the effect of expectations from the new governor. |
Weak rootedness in the region is complemented by the anxiety of local elites, who, due to fears of further “anti-corruption” steps, are not active and cannot serve as a full-fledged support. |
||
|
Kostroma region |
Sergei Sitnikov |
He managed to get out of conflict situations without making obvious mistakes. Attention to the region by outsiders remains low. |
Until he created his own history of managerial and political success. |
|||
|
Kurgan region |
Alexey Kokorin |
Taking into account the traditionally low expectations from the region's economy, it demonstrates managerial will and desire for change. |
Opportunities to present managerial successes are still limited. |
|||
|
Kursk region |
Alexander Mikhailov |
He holds the record for political survival. Although this record is considered difficult to explain, the period of the main problems was over and the attacks on A. Mikhailov were repulsed. |
The lack of explanation of the phenomenon of A. Mikhailov's political survival at any moment can make him a target for criticism, lead to his positioning as an "old school manager" and a person who attracts electoral fatigue. |
|||
|
Leningrad region |
Alexander Drozdenko |
He turned out to be one of the most successful appointees of 2012. He achieved increased diversification of the economy, which allows using both the transit position of the region (development of ports, modernization of infrastructure before the 2018 FIFA World Cup), and periodic waves of self-isolation (development of agriculture, etc.). |
The region remains extremely attractive for potential stakeholders, including in the context of resolving the issue of power in St. Petersburg. |
|||
|
Lipetsk region |
Oleg Korolev |
Despite its economic attractiveness, the region is almost absent from the federal agenda. Relations with the Novolipetsk Iron and Steel Works are generally stabilized, and serious mutual irritation does not accumulate. |
The region is interesting for competitors. The flip side of the absence of the region on the agenda may be the lack of a stable reputation for the governor of a successful manager who has achieved powerful results. |
|||
|
Magadan Region |
Vladimir Pecheny |
It does not allow the formation of a negative agenda. Maintains a high level of control over both the economic and political life of the region. |
The success of his work as governor was almost not a subject of discussion. As a consequence, there are opportunities for both positive and negative interpretation of the results of his work. |
|||
|
Moscow region |
Andrey Vorobyov |
All-federal fame combined with the image of a modern and promising governor focused on formation strong team. This is supported by federal connections and high public activity. |
Relations with the elites within the region are often tense, while the dissatisfied part has ample opportunity to broadcast their interpretations to the federal authorities. A new reason for this may be the municipal reform that has begun. |
|||
|
Murmansk region |
Marina Kovtun |
It avoided using the election campaign to weaken its positions, demonstrating a further increase in claims to influence the regional elites. |
The “cleansing” of Murmansk from A. Weller did not lead to the formation of a pro-governor configuration in the city. The conflict style of interaction with the elites can create additional tension. |
|||
|
Nizhny Novgorod Region |
Valery Shantsev |
The governor is a "heavyweight" with great federal connections, who managed to ensure his own political dominance in the region and give dynamics to its economic development. |
The protracted conflict over control over Nizhny Novgorod has become a serious hole in the image of the "omnipotent" governor. Traditionally, uncertainty remains high around the strategies of the current and former heads of the embassy in relation to the region. |
|||
|
Novgorod region |
Sergey Mitin |
Able to effectively promote the results of his work when communicating with federal officials. Some experts point out that interaction with the Valdai dacha community contributes to the lobbying potential. |
The approaching expiration date of the term actualizes the negative agenda - including the unresolved issue of power in the regional center and criminal cases against the governor's entourage. |
|||
|
Novosibirsk region |
Vladimir Gorodetsky |
The election results turned out to be higher than expected - also due to the ability to form an elite coalition under the auspices of United Russia. |
The lack of personal charisma is especially noticeable against the backdrop of rivalry with the mayor of Novosibirsk, A. Lokt. |
|||
|
Omsk region |
Victor Nazarov |
3+/4- (4) |
During the elections to the State Duma, he achieved good results, preventing the strengthening of the positions of the Communist Party. Capable of building interaction with individual federal business groups, including Sberbank. |
In a region with high internal competition, he remains an apolitical figure, as a result of which he may not have time to respond to the possible formation of a negative agenda for the governor (as it almost happened in the elections in 2015). |
||
|
Orenburg region |
Yuri Berg |
The alignment of relations with key business groups in an economically self-sufficient region allows maintaining dominance in the region. Attempts to consolidate dissatisfaction with the authorities around opposition figures ended in failure. |
There is a hidden intra-elite opposition - especially in the regional center, where it was not possible to establish a full-fledged "chemistry" in relations with the elites and part of the inhabitants. |
|||
|
Oryol Region |
Vadim Potomsky |
The offensive style and the status of a political appointee from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation make it possible to have political initiative within the region and develop an offensive against opponents. |
Critics are positioning the governor as an eccentric and impulsive figure who prefers to work on a conflict agenda. The exhaustion of the resource of the “coalition governors” model can play against V. Potomsky. |
|||
|
Penza region |
Ivan Belozertsev |
Managed to confirm the idea of a stable position in the region. The death of ex-governor V. Bochkarev made it possible to prevent the formation of a parallel center of political influence. |
The relative invisibility of the region to the federal government creates a shortage of lobbying resources. |
|||
|
Pskov region |
Andrey Turchak |
Repeatedly demonstrated the ability to get out of the blow and correct the direction of negative "undercurrents" for himself. The position of one of the "allergens" in the eyes of the liberal opposition for a long time contributed to the retention in office in the face of an anti-liberal trend. |
Motivation to pursue a career in the region is relatively low. At the same time, the Pskov region may turn out to be a convenient platform for demonstrating the reset of relations between the authorities and the opposition through the replacement of the most controversial persons in terms of public image. |
|||
|
Rostov region |
Vasily Golubev |
He successfully positions the region as a border region (which stabilizes relations with law enforcement agencies), and also uses the theme of import substitution in agriculture. Built a balanced relationship with the federal elites. |
The real level of tension within the elites is not completely clear. The region is attractive to external players. |
|||
|
Ryazan Oblast |
Oleg Kovalev |
Successfully overcame past crises associated with the threat of replacement. One of the reasons for this was the low attractiveness of the region for external players. |
The approach of the end of office brings back to the agenda the problem of lack of achievements against the backdrop of health conditions. |
|||
|
Samara Region |
Nikolay Merkushkin |
Managerial experience, combined with federal connections, creates a certain margin of safety - especially given the difficulty of finding and agreeing on a replacement candidate. |
Public hyperactivity causes irritation of elites of different levels and excessive all-Russian recognition. There are problems around the legitimacy of voting in elections to the State Duma. |
|||
|
Saratov region |
Valery Radaev |
2+/ (3+) |
Historically, it has been in the shadow of federal politicians. It helps to prevent the formation of a negative agenda around the region. |
The lack of political subjectivity makes a vulnerable figure for opponents and reduces the value for supporters. |
||
|
Sakhalin region |
Oleg Kozhemyako |
It has a significant credit of trust at the federal level due to experience in previous regions. He was able to create expectations among the population. Able to implement federal initiatives related to the redistribution of finances between the Far Eastern regions. |
Due to previous experience, it is possible to underestimate the risks associated with elite discontent. Within the region, there are questions about the quality of the management team. |
|||
|
Sverdlovsk region |
Evgeny Kuyvashev |
Engaged in building a configuration with the local elites, temporarily reducing the sharpness of the split. The activity of business groups capable of opposing is gradually decreasing. |
The imminent expiration date raises the question of electability in competitive elections, given the lack of charisma and low popularity. The decision to head the regional government may attract electoral risks. |
|||
|
Smolensk region |
Alexey Ostrovsky |
The political status of the LDPR appointee, taking into account V. Zhirinovsky's attempts to position himself as the main supporter of the current government among the opposition parliamentary parties. The attractiveness of the region for external players is low. |
The lack of positive dynamics did not allow creating a full-fledged success story, making the figure vulnerable to criticism and hostage to the viability of a configuration with opposition governors. |
|||
|
Tambov Region |
Alexander Nikitin |
The federal credibility is maintained. Demonstrates activity to attract investment. |
Until he created a powerful wave of expectations around him. A recent attempt to run for office in the RAS can be used against the governor. |
|||
|
Tver region |
Igor Rudenya |
4+ (2) |
Recent election amid substantial federal support. |
Weak roots in the region. Conditional legitimacy due to victory in non-competitive elections. Weak image positioning. |
||
|
Tomsk region |
Sergey Zhvachkin |
He was able to reduce the degree of socio-political activity in the region. Can rely on the support of "Gazprom". |
He failed to achieve early elections, which, given the close deadline for the expiration of his powers, will be read as a weakness. |
|||
|
Tula region |
Alexey Dyumin |
5- (2) |
Won direct elections with demonstrative federal support. |
So far, it is only developing operational management skills at the regional level, not being able to fully rely on local elites. |
||
|
Tyumen region |
Vladimir Yakushev |
He strengthened his positions in relations with autonomous regions, including relying on established ties with oil and gas companies and the federal lobbying resource. |
The region remains attractive to external players, and attempts to pursue a policy of enlargement of regions may carry additional risks. |
|||
|
Ulyanovsk region |
Sergey Morozov |
Despite the activity of his opponents, he managed to achieve an extension of his powers and won the gubernatorial elections. Positions at the federal level have been stabilized. |
The risks associated with frequent team rotation and intra-elite tension remain. |
|||
|
Chelyabinsk region |
Boris Dubrovsky |
Lack of obvious replacement candidates. |
Lack of managerial and political competencies against the background of increased activity of law enforcement agencies and the presence of a large number of hidden opponents in the elites. |
|||
|
Yaroslavl region |
Dmitry Mironov |
4 (3-) |
Recent appointment, promoting the reputation of an official with a federal background. He took operational steps to recruit his own team. |
Lack of alignment with local elites against the backdrop of the need to develop managerial skills. Sustainability of traditions of competition in local politics. |
||
|
Moscow |
Sergei Sobyanin |
President's confidence. The absence of serious restrictions from the Moscow City Duma, local elites, political parties. Ability to build balanced relationships with federal elite groups. Absence of hard pressure from law enforcement agencies. |
Low efficiency of managing media campaigns (when solving technical situations, one has to spend personal political capital). The lack of a political risk management system is exacerbated by a lack of personal charisma. |
|||
|
Saint Petersburg |
Georgy Poltavchenko |
He managed to prevent the growth of protest moods in the city. The difficulty of negotiating a replacement candidate ensures career longevity. |
Personal motivation to remain in office is relatively low against the background of talk about the possibility of moving to the federal level. The negative informational background is created by scandals around the preparations for the World Cup, which attract the attention of law enforcement agencies. |
|||
|
Jewish Autonomous Region |
Alexander Levinthal |
The relatively recent appointment has created additional expectations within and outside the region - especially if the policy to attract investment and create a priority development area is successful. |
We have to act in the face of a deteriorating budget situation, to overcome the problems of personnel shortages and the inertia of perception as "non-local". |
|||
|
Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
Igor Koshin |
Initiative. Activity. The presence of allies at the federal level. Discussion of hypothetical scenarios for unification with the Arkhangelsk region under the dominance of the NAO. |
The abolition of direct elections created the threat of a decrease in political subjectivity, which is significant given the traditions of the high dynamics of intra-elite life. The tasks of creating a successful management case have not been solved yet. |
|||
|
Natalia Komarova |
Managed to build relationships with part of the oil companies. The abolition of direct elections reduced the political weight of the governor, but helped to avoid electoral risks. |
There is a high level of conflict at the district, municipal and regional levels, which can make the governor a target for attacks, given the high attractiveness of the region for any applicants. |
||||
|
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug |
Roman Kopin |
The district does not create problems for the federal agenda. |
There is no stable managerial reputation of both positive and negative content. |
|||
|
Dmitry Kobylkin |
He heads one of the "showcase" regions in terms of socio-economic policy. At the same time, he successfully builds relationships with Gazprom and Novatek. |
The abolition of direct elections makes relations with the Tyumen region unbalanced. Periodically nominated among candidates for federal posts. |
||||
|
Crimea |
Sergei Aksenov |
4 |
He acted as one of the leaders in the process of joining the Crimea to Russia. Successfully uses the priority of the topic of Crimea for the federal authorities |
Enters into periodic conflicts with federal agencies. There is a risk of nominating deputies of the State Duma from Crimea as alternatives to the current head. |
sept. 19 |
|
|
Sevastopol |
Dmitry Ovsyannikov |
5- |
Successfully uses the image effect after replacing the unpopular governor. Concluded a situational alliance with A. Chalym. Achieved the return of direct elections. Can rely on federal business groups. |
Does not have sufficient experience in public policy. It faces the task of increasing the electoral rating. It is possible to underestimate the acuteness of the elite contradictions and the protest potential in the city. |
Interim |
List of experts
- Badovsky Dmitry, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies;
- Vinogradov Mikhail, President of the Petersburg Politics Foundation;
- Gusev Dmitry, political strategist;
- Dachenkov Igor, Director General of the Mass Communications Agency "Region Media";
- Kostin Konstantin, Chairman of the Board of the Civil Society Development Fund;
- Kuznetsov Gleb, deputy director of the National Institute for the Development of Contemporary Ideology;
- Kurbangaleeva Ekaterina, director of the ANO "NIC "Special Opinion";
- Matveychev Oleg, Professor high school economy;
- Minchenko Evgeny, President of the communication holding "Minchenko Consulting";
- Roshkov Evgeny, Managing Partner of Kesarev Consulting;
- Turovsky Rostislav, director general of the Agency for Regional Studies;
- Shcherbakov Fedor, political scientist.
Annex 1. Economic statistics of the regions
Green Zone . 10th to 10th place. 2 points
Blue zone. From 11 to 20 places. 1 point
Orange zone. From 66 to 75 places. Minus 1 point.
Red zone. From 76 to 85 places. Minus 2 points.
Annex 2. High-profile criminal cases against high-ranking representatives of the teams of current governors
|
Region |
Data on criminal cases, detentions, arrests of officials of regional governments and administrations |
|
|
Adygea |
||
|
Altai Republic |
||
|
Bashkortostan |
||
|
Buryatia |
Manzyanov Alexander. Minister of Agriculture. In July 2016, he was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison on charges of abuse of power. On parole in September 2016 Krivosheev Nikolay. Former head of the Republican Forestry Agency. In May 2016, shortly after his dismissal of his own free will, he became a defendant in a criminal case on abuse of office |
|
|
Dagestan |
Kazibekov Ibragim. Minister of Construction and Housing. In September 2016, a criminal case was initiated for failure to provide a resident of the republic with funds for the purchase of housing. In response, he sued the bailiff service, demanding 100 million rubles from it. for moral damage. Currently continuing to perform duties |
|
|
Ingushetia |
Kostoev Ruslan. Minister of Agriculture. In October 2016, he was detained as part of a criminal case on charges of abuse of power. Removed from office. |
|
|
Kabardino-Balkaria |
Eristova Lyana. Minister of Property and Land Relations. In November 2016, a criminal case was initiated on charges of abuse of office and forgery of documents. Temporarily removed from office. |
|
|
Kalmykia |
||
|
Karachay-Cherkessia |
||
|
Karelia |
||
|
Komi |
Shabarshina Elena. The head of the administration of the head of Komi, Elena Shabarshina. In June 2016, she was dismissed after initiating a criminal case on accepting a bribe on a large scale, she attempted suicide. Chosen measure of restraint in the form of bail |
|
|
Mari El |
||
|
Mordovia |
||
|
Sakha |
||
|
North Ossetia |
||
|
Tatarstan |
||
|
Tuva |
Tyt-ool Yuri. Deputy Head of the Republic, former Minister of Agriculture and Food. In October 2016, he was dismissed after initiating a criminal case on misappropriation of budget funds |
|
|
Udmurtia |
||
|
Khakassia |
Novikov Sergey. Minister of Construction and Housing. He was imprisoned in a pre-trial detention center, but later released on bail, the case was reclassified from fraud to abuse of power. Released from office |
|
|
Chechnya |
||
|
Chuvashia |
||
|
Altai region |
Denisov Yuri. Former Deputy Governor, Head of the Main Department of Education. Shortly after being dismissed from office in March 2016, he became accused of taking a bribe through his wife. Both were placed in a pre-trial detention center. The term of arrest expires on January 4 |
|
|
Transbaikal region |
||
|
Kamchatka Krai |
||
|
Krasnodar region |
||
|
Krasnoyarsk region |
||
|
Perm region |
Zakiev Almaz. Transport Minister. In October 2016, a criminal case was initiated on charges of lobbying the interests of a commercial structure. Suspended from execution official duties. He is under bail. Lyakh Pavel. Minister physical education and sports. In October 2016, he was detained as part of an investigation into the theft during the reconstruction of the Dynamo stadium. He is under house arrest. Baluev Evgeny. Minister of Information Development and Communications. In June 2016, he was detained on charges of fraud, and later a case was opened on illegal possession of weapons. In August, he was dismissed from the post of minister. The arrest has been extended until February. Fedorovsky Victor. Minister of Construction and Housing. In early 2016, after initiating a criminal case on charges of illegal participation in entrepreneurial activities, he wrote a letter of resignation. The court declared that there were no grounds for criminal prosecution, and a fine of 145,000 rubles was imposed. |
|
|
Primorsky Krai |
Yezhov Oleg. Vice Governor. In early May 2016, he was detained by FSB officers on charges of abuse of official powers when paying for construction and installation work under a state contract. A few days before the arrest, he resigned. |
|
|
Stavropol region |
Lyamin Vasily. Minister of education. In October 2015, he was sentenced to 7.5 years on charges of taking bribes and extortion. |
|
|
Khabarovsk region |
Ignatovich Sergei. Deputy Prime Minister. In February 2016, he was arrested and placed under house arrest (accused of embezzling a large sum during the construction of a residential complex). Released from his post. Skomorokhov Andrey. Minister of Construction. . In February 2016, he was arrested and placed under house arrest (accused of embezzling a large sum during the construction of a residential complex). Released from his post. Davidenko Alexander. Former Minister of Property Relations. In February 2016, he was sentenced to 7.5 years in prison on charges of fraud. In June 2016, the term was reduced to 6 years. Kravchuk Nikolay. Former Deputy Prime Minister. In December 2015, he was charged with abuse of power. Declared on the international wanted list. |
|
|
Amur region |
Vologdin Sergey. Former Minister of Agriculture. Accused of fraud, illegal possession of ammunition, causing the death of a person in violation of the Rules traffic. Sentenced to probation. |
|
|
Arhangelsk region |
||
|
Astrakhan region |
||
|
Belgorod region |
||
|
Bryansk region |
Morozov Alexander. Former director regional department of architecture and construction. Sentenced to 300 hours of forced labor on charges of negligence. Alexander Morozov, found guilty of negligence, due to which the region lost subsidies to support entrepreneurship Poleshchenko Dmitry. Former Head of the Department of Property Relations. A criminal case was opened on charges of abuse of power |
|
|
Vladimir region |
Khvostov Dmitry. Former Vice Governor for Construction. Left the post in September. In October 2016, a criminal case was initiated on charges of accepting a bribe on an especially large scale. In December 2016, an additional episode was added to the case. He was detained in Krasnodar, is under arrest. |
|
|
Volgograd region |
||
|
Vologda Region |
Sergey Tugarin. Former Lieutenant Governor. Sentenced to 2 years 10 months for abuse of authority. The verdict was canceled in May 2016 after an appeal. |
|
|
Voronezh region |
||
|
Ivanovo region |
Kulikov Dmitry. First Lieutenant Governor In May 2016, he was detained on charges of taking a bribe from the former head of Ivanovo for resolving issues related to the circulation of land. Soon transferred under house arrest. Released on bail in November 2016. According to media reports, after that he returned to his duties. Kabanov Andrey. First Deputy Prime Minister. In August 2015, a criminal case was initiated on charges of taking a bribe. He was placed under house arrest, then the preventive measure was changed to a written undertaking not to leave. In November 2016, it was approved closing indictment. The case has been taken to court. The start of the trial is scheduled for December 20. |
|
|
Irkutsk region |
||
|
Kaliningrad region |
||
|
Kaluga region |
Alexander Bolkhovitin. Former Minister of Construction and Housing. Sentenced to 3 years in prison for embezzlement. |
|
|
Kemerovo region |
Ivanov Alexey. Danilchenko Alexander. Deputy Governor. In November 2016, he was detained as part of a criminal case on charges of extortion. He is under house arrest. |
|
|
Kirov region |
Anufriev Pavel. And about. Minister of Enterprise Development, Trade and Foreign Relations. In September 2016, a criminal case was initiated on charges of organizing embezzlement. Placed under house arrest. |
|
|
Kostroma region |
||
|
Kurgan region |
Sukhanov Pavel. And about. director of the department of property and land relations. In September 2016, he was arrested on charges of forgery and fraud. The term of arrest has been extended until January 27, 2017. |
|
|
Kursk region |
Vadim Drozhenko. Head of the regional committee of social security. Sentenced to 3 years in prison for abuse of power in the construction of housing for orphans |
|
|
Leningrad region |
||
|
Lipetsk region |
||
|
Magadan Region |
||
|
Moscow region |
||
|
Murmansk region |
||
|
Nizhny Novgorod Region |
Gorelov Nikolay. Director of the forestry department. A criminal case has been opened on charges of abuse of power. In January 2017, the case is expected to go to court. He is under house arrest. Alexander Makarov. Minister of Industry, Trade and Entrepreneurship. In April 2016, he was sentenced to 4.5 years in prison for abuse of office. |
|
|
Novgorod region |
Shalmuev Arnold. First Lieutenant Governor In April 2013, he was arrested on charges of embezzlement of budget funds. In March 2016, he was sentenced to 8 years and 10 months in prison. In November 2016, he was relieved of his post after the sentence came into force. Nechaev Victor. Vice Governor. In August 2015, he was arrested on charges of attempted fraud. In August 2016, he was sentenced to 3 years in prison. |
|
|
Novosibirsk region |
||
|
Omsk region |
Hamburg Yuri. First Deputy Prime Minister. In June 2014, he was arrested on charges of fraud with land plots committed while working in the administration of Omsk. In June 2016, he was sentenced to 5.5 years in prison. |
|
|
Orenburg region |
Pivonov Oleg. Sports Minister. In October 2016, a criminal case was opened on charges of abuse of power. Temporarily removed from office. He is under house arrest. |
|
|
Oryol Region |
||
|
Penza region |
||
|
Pskov region |
||
|
Rostov region |
Elena Skidan. Former Minister of Labor and Social Development. A suspended sentence for abuse of power. Sergey Sokolov. Head of the Department of Transport of the Regional Ministry of Transport. A criminal case on charges of abuse of power has been sent to court. |
|
|
Ryazan Oblast |
Andreev Dmitry. Deputy Prime Minister. In October 2015, he was arrested on charges of taking a bribe. In March 2016, another criminal case was initiated on taking a bribe. Is under arrest. |
|
|
Samara Region |
Nekrasov Roman. Deputy Minister of Agriculture. A criminal case is being investigated on suspicion of negligence. |
|
|
Saratov region |
||
|
Sakhalin region |
||
|
Sverdlovsk region |
Sidorenko Alexander. And about. transport minister. In November 2016, searches were carried out as part of a criminal case on charges of illegal business activities. A few days later he was dismissed. |
|
|
Smolensk region |
Novikova Julia. Former head of the regional department for social development. Under house arrest, suspected of embezzlement |
|
|
Tambov Region |
||
|
Tver region |
||
|
Tomsk region |
Trubitsyn Andrey. Former Lieutenant Governor. Charged with abuse of power. In August 2016, he was sentenced to 4 years of probation. Knyazev Alexey. Former Lieutenant Governor. Sentenced in September 2015 to 5 years of probation on charges of embezzlement while working at a university. In September 2016, he was sentenced to 5 years of probation. |
|
|
Tula region |
||
|
Tyumen region |
Mitrofanov Pavel. Former Lieutenant Governor. In October 2015, he was put on the international wanted list on charges of giving a bribe. |
|
|
Ulyanovsk region |
||
|
Chelyabinsk region |
Sandakov Nikolay. Deputy Governor. In March 2015, he was arrested on suspicion of taking a bribe, and was also charged with illegal access to computer information (then reclassified as fraud). In March 2016, he was released on bail, but a few days later he was detained on suspicion of taking a bribe from the director of a private security company, who provided security services to the regional authorities. In April 2016, he was placed under house arrest. Serebrennikov Yuri. Former sports minister. Sentenced to 5 years in prison for accepting multi-million dollar bribes. |
|
|
Yaroslavl region |
||
|
Moscow |
||
|
Saint Petersburg |
Hovhannisyan Marat. Former Lieutenant Governor. In November 2016, he was arrested on charges of fraud during the construction of the Zenit Arena stadium. |
|
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Jewish Autonomous Region |
Solntsev Victor. Chairman of the property management committee. Released from office following charges of abuse of power. |
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Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
Drozdov Nikolay. Head of Property and Land Resources Department. Sentenced to 6 years in prison and a fine of 12.5 million rubles for taking a bribe on an especially large scale |
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Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug |
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Chukotka Autonomous Okrug |
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Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
Kucherenko Vyacheslav. Former head of the agro-industrial complex. Conditional sentence for embezzlement Stepanov Vasily. Vice Governor. Resigned after searches in a criminal case on fraud, one of the defendants in which is his father, Deputy Director of the Microfinance Fund for Small Businesses Valery Stepanov |
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Crimea |
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Sevastopol |
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